(Aug 2023) What International Human Rights Groups and Agreements, and Global Health Orgs, Say About “Conscientious Objection” in Healthcare

This document is a compilation of everything relevant to “conscientious objection” in reproductive healthcare, as contained in international human rights agreements, and guidelines/reports by global health and human rights groups and governing bodies that have weighed in on the topic. The excerpts are contextualized by the view that “CO” in healthcare is inappropriate, unworkable, and not a right.

Compiled by Joyce Arthur, Initiative for Reproductive Health Information (IRHI), joyce@joycearthur.com

Access full document here (29 pages, PDF): Intl-groups-agreements-CO

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Victims of “CO” – Introduction

Here is a collection of stories where women were refused a legal abortion and suffered serious injury or injustice as a result, including death in some cases. Doctors and hospitals are rarely punished or convicted for these wrongdoings.

Media coverage about serious consequences of the refusal to treat under CO usually only happens when a woman dies, or a woman or her family sues. Here are their stories we could find, but these must be the tip of the iceberg. We know nothing about the vast majority of refusals to treat under CO, or what happens to the victims.

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(2023) Countries that Disallow “Conscientious Objection”

Jan 27, 2023
By Joyce Arthur

It has been claimed by various researchers or NGOs that certain countries do not allow “conscientious objection” (belief-based care denial) in reproductive healthcare or healthcare in general. This document examines those claims for each of the named countries. Only four countries were found to explicitly disallow “CO” – Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Finland, and Sweden.

PDF (9 pages) Countries that Disallow “Conscientious Objection”

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Agnieszka T (2022) † Poland

Pregnant woman miscarrying twins dies of (likely) sepsis because doctors waited for fetuses to die.

Agnieszka, a mother of three, was pregnant with twins during her first trimester when she was admitted to the Blessed Virgin Mary Hospital in Częstochowa on December 21, 2021, with abdominal pain and vomiting. According to her family, she arrived at the hospital in “good physical and mental shape.” After two days in the hospital, one of the heartbeats of the twins stopped and, according to Agnieszka’s family, the doctors refused to remove it, citing Poland’s abortion laws. (But the law allows abortion to in cases of rape or incest or when pregnancy threatens a woman’s health or life.)

Agnieszka’s family said that after the first fetus died “her state quickly deteriorated.”  Her twin sister, Wioletta Paciepnik said “Her husband begged the doctors to save his wife, even at the cost of the pregnancy.”  But Agnieszka was forced to carry the fetus for another seven days until the second twin died on December 29. The doctors still didn’t terminate the pregnancy for another two days until December 31.  A priest was then summoned by hospital staff to perform a funeral for the twins, the family said.

Agnieszka then remained in the hospital for weeks with deteriorating health and ultimately died on January 25. Her family suspect that she died of sepsis but the cause of death was not identified in a statement released by the hospital.

Sources: The Guardian, Jan 28, 2022: Protests flare across Poland after death of young mother denied an abortion.  Newsweek, Jan 31, 2022: Government Has ‘Blood on Its Hands’ Family Says After Woman Denied Abortion Dies.

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30 women (anonymous) – USA

Women’s health and lives are frequently put at risk in American Catholic hospitals, but only a few cases are publicized. We count 77 so far – 30 mostly anonymous cases are included here, and the rest described individually by name on the main “Victims of CO” page.

  • Six individual cases are described in this Columbia Law School Report (Dec 2021):  The Southern Hospitals Report: Faith, Culture, and Abortion Bans in the U.S. South. However, the report makes reference to the routine refusal of termination care in the southern U.S. affecting hundreds of women – in many cases risking their lives and health or causing grave suffering and injustice.
  • One case (besides Alison’s and Meghan’s) is described in this Rewire article (Sep 2019): A Miscarrying Woman Nearly Died After a Catholic Hospital Sent Her Home Three Times.
  • Three cases (besides Chelsea’s) are described in this Rewire article (Mar 2019): ‘Not Dead Enough’: Public Hospitals Deny Life-Saving Abortion Care to People in Need
  • Four cases (besides Tamesha’s) are described in the The Guardian article (2016): Abortion ban linked to dangerous miscarriages at Catholic hospital.
  • Six cases are described in the American Civil Liberties Association report (2016): Health Care Denied: Patients and Physicians Speak Out About Catholic Hospitals and the Threat to Women’s Health and Lives.
  • One case is described in the American Civil Liberties Association report (2013, page 14): Miscarriage of Medicine: The Growth of Catholic Hospitals and the Threat to Reproductive Health Care.
  • One case is described in AJOB Primary Research (2013): Conflicts in Care for Obstetric Complications in Catholic Hospitals.
  • Three cases are described by the National Health Law Program (2010): Health Care Refusals: Undermining Quality Care for Women.
  • Four cases are described in the American Journal of Public Health (2008): When There’s a Heartbeat: Miscarriage Management in Catholic-Owned Hospitals.
  • One case is described in JAMA (2007): A Question of Faith.

Excerpts are below (names and dates are mostly unknown).

Dec 2021 Southern Hospitals Report excerpts:

1)  Page 9:  Dr. Jamila Perritt, president and CEO of Physicians for Reproductive Health, said:

I have colleagues that have expressed concerns their patients were not getting appropriate care because they were in religiously affiliated institutions…  One particular patient stands out whose water broke at 20 weeks. Typically in this case, we review options for care as well as the
risks and benefits of each with the patient so that they can make the most informed decision. In this case these risks include an increased risk for infection, hemorrhage, and other outcomes that could put the pregnant person’s life at risk. But, this isn’t what happened for this patient. The providers only discussed one option – remaining pregnant. This person, my colleague, called me on my personal cell phone because we had been in training together and we’ve known each other for years and she said, ‘This is bad, this is malpractice. No one at all will even discuss an abortion with her and I’m afraid if I bring it up I’ll be penalized for even talking about it given the environment I’m practicing in’.

2) Page 10:  One doctor working in a publicly affiliated facility in the Midwest said a a patient had been denied both an abortion and, she suspected, the best possible treatment for her cancer because of the hospital’s restrictive policies. The patient had acute leukemia and wanted to end her pregnancy, but her treating oncologists wrote in her medical chart that her pregnancy would not have any impact on her cancer care:

Because that was in her medical chart—that treatment was not going to change—it meant that from the hospital’s perspective she didn’t have a medical indication for termination of pregnancy. And we do not do elective terminations at our hospital.

We tried almost everything to get her the care she needed. She was deemed too sick to transfer to another hospital that would do that procedure and she essentially remained in the hospital for weeks being pregnant. She ultimately got a spinal abscess that caused  quadriplegia, and she was still not allowed to have a termination…

She eventually miscarried at 17 weeks, which was about eight to nine weeks from her initial admission to the hospital. A miscarriage at 17 weeks is more difficult on the human body than an abortion at eight weeks. So that was unfortunate and difficult and frustrating…

Talking to some of the consultants on the side, some of them did feel like her [leukemia] care would change [if she weren’t pregnant]. They could try different treatments, they could do the same treatments but do it more aggressively and they wouldn’t have to worry about fetal effects or anything like that… [but] our hospital has to report…how many abortions are done at that hospital and they try their hardest to make that number zero.

3) Page 24:  A medical resident working at a public hospital in Texas where abortions are severely restricted explained that doctors in her facility treat “a lot of women” experiencing symptoms of an early miscarriage where the “fetus does still have a heartbeat.” In these cases, providers do not even counsel patients about the possibility of ending their pregnancy. “We just sort of tell them…‘we’re going to watch and wait’. I’ve talked to some of my co-residents who’ve trained at other medical schools and…oftentimes they’re shocked by how we do miscarriage management.”

One doctor said of her publicly affiliated hospital in the Midwest: “You have to actually be dying, like, the day you get your abortion. You can’t be, like, dying tomorrow.” For example, this doctor recounted a patient who had:

“a huge mass on her cervix and she had invasive cervical cancer. And the treatment for that is… termination, and then chemotherapy and  radiation. And [the person I called for ethics approval] essentially said because she wasn’t dying that day, they couldn’t do her abortion. But it’s not something that like Planned Parenthood can do vaginally. This was like a hysterectomy—major procedure—because if you try to do it vaginally, she would bleed to death.”

In this case, the provider team was forced to research whether another hospital could perform the patient’s procedure or administer a potassium chloride injection to end her pregnancy (“so we wouldn’t technically be doing an abortion”). Eventually, the doctors were able to treat the patient, “[b]ut it just took like a ton of energy from her oncologist, her OB-GYN, ethics, our risk assessment people. Just an unnecessary stall in her care.”

4) Page 25:  Abortion restrictions could also result in traumatic experiences for patients facing fetal anomalies. Speaking of her residency in a public institution in the South, an OB-GYN said, “abortion was never talked about, it was never offered.” She recalled how patients with “horrific anomalies” would carry pregnancies to term rather than being offered the option of abortion care. One patient in particular had a fetus diagnosed with acrania, meaning it had no skull and would be unlikely to survive more than a couple days outside the womb. The doctor explained:

The way a fetus comes out of the birth canal requires a lot of head movement from the fetus… and so the one patient I had, the [fetus’s] head got stuck because it doesn’t know how to navigate the birth canal without an actual skull. And it was this horrifically long…prolonged labor, it ends up being horrific and taking forever…I would have felt way different had I  known that she was given a choice and that this was important to her to deliver this baby and carry this baby… as opposed to traumatizing really everyone involved. I felt particularly traumatized knowing that there was a different option that I didn’t think she had been given.

While this incident stood out in the doctor’s memory because she was in charge of the patient’s delivery, she said it was “pretty common” for patients in her facility to carry to term and go through labor without having been offered, or counseled about, abortion as an option in the case of severe fetal anomaly.

5) Page 30:  A medical resident at a public hospital in Texas had a patient with kidney disease who was close to the legal gestational age limit for abortion in Texas at the time. A clinic had sent her to seek care at a hospital because they “felt uncomfortable doing [an abortion] outpatient because of her severe medical comorbidities.” The doctor said that if this patient had continued her pregnancy, it could have “shorten[ed] her life significantly.” Nevertheless, the hospital’s burdensome approval process made it impossible for her to receive abortion care in time at the facility. The doctor explained that performing the patient’s abortion:

“would have to go through a large review process, where our maternal fetal medicine doctors would have to go before a committee in the hospital that consists of people in the hospital that are administrators, high-level—and not even OB-GYN physicians—and they would make a final decision of whether or not this termination would be approved. And that whole  process takes several weeks, to get everything together and have all these meetings… What we ended up saying to [the patient] was, ‘we can’t get you this in time, so either you can establish care here and we will take care of you during your pregnancy as you continue it, or you need to go elsewhere.’… It was very frustrating that this woman was very sick and very much in need of this procedure—like one of the most medically necessary things you can make up in your mind—and it was not something we could offer her.”

6) Page 32:  One doctor shared a particularly disturbing story about how an
anti-abortion psychiatrist in her facility—who would never be required to perform an abortion—still managed to impact patient care during the doctor’s residency in Ohio. When a patient transported from jail came to the hospital, she was pregnant and having suicidal thoughts.

The psychiatrist interviewed her and came out to discuss the case with the OB team. She told us the patient wasn’t suicidal, but rather, ‘feticidal,’ and should be discharged to jail. When we argued with her, she added that the patient had ‘a history of feticidal ideation’ because she’d had appointments for an abortion earlier in the pregnancy, but never went. The hospital ethicist and legal department refused to intervene. We couldn’t even transfer her to the university hospital because we couldn’t give her the diagnosis of ‘suicidal ideation.’

They wouldn’t let us keep her in the hospital. We discharged her from the hospital with no help, no support, and told her to follow up with outpatient resources. She was never seen again. The medical records in the city’s hospitals were mostly linked, so I could see that she never presented for care after that. I read obituaries for a long time looking for her name, scanned local news for updates, and nothing ever came up. The case haunts me to this day.

Sep 2019 Rewire excerpts:

A few years ago, Dr. Brigit Brock, a maternal fetal medicine specialist, was working at her outpatient consultation clinic in Everett, about 30 miles north of Seattle, when a patient arrived in preterm labor. At 20 or 21 weeks pregnant, before the fetus is viable, the patient’s cervix was open; her amniotic sac and parts of the umbilical cord were in the vagina. The patient needed to be hospitalized immediately, so she and her colleagues sent her to Providence Regional Medical Center Everett, a Catholic hospital attached to Brock’s outpatient clinic.

But the labor and delivery nurse told the patient and her husband that the Catholic hospital didn’t participate in abortions. Dr. Brock said: “She’s in pain and this is a devastating thing for them to go through, and they were not allowed even to step onto the labor and delivery floor.” When the patient returned to the outpatient clinic, Brock knew that if she called an ambulance, it might take some time to arrive and would likely take the woman back to Providence. So she told the patient’s husband to drive her to Swedish Medical Center in Seattle, which would take up to an hour in traffic.

Dr. Brock said it’s not the only time she’s seen this kind of case. “People think this is a rare event. This is not a rare event. This happens frequently.” Brock often works at Swedish Medical Center in Seattle, where she sometimes “rescues” patients from Catholic hospitals in surrounding communities by pulling them into the Swedish system.

Mar 2019 Rewire excerpts:

1) When she arrived at the public hospital in Texas, the woman was so sick she couldn’t walk. About four months pregnant, she needed an abortion to save her life. A previous pregnancy had led to heart failure. This time she faced a higher risk of death from cardiac arrest that increased as the pregnancy advanced.

But the hospital’s leadership denied her the abortion she needed. “It was decided that she was not going to be dying at that moment,” said Dr. Ghazaleh Moayedi, who cared for the patient. “It really was almost a cruel joke: that she wasn’t really dead enough to warrant intervention.”

When Moayedi broke the news, the patient was devastated. She was too ill to be seen in an outpatient clinic that lacked advanced resuscitation and heart monitoring equipment. Her options were to travel to New Mexico and pay thousands of dollars for a hospital abortion there—which she couldn’t afford—or continue a pregnancy that might kill her. Like millions of people in Texas, she lacked health insurance. Moayedi doesn’t know what happened to the patient. She never saw her again.

2) After she moved to another part of Texas, Moayedi appealed to a different public hospital for a patient with a pregnancy condition that put her at risk for complications including hysterectomy and hemorrhaging. The case seemed urgent to Moayedi, who had already watched one patient who carried a pregnancy to term with this condition require a 13-unit blood transfusion—more blood than a human body typically contains.

Again, hospital leadership said no to the abortion. “The response was that it was not actually imminently life-threatening, that sometimes people lived from the condition and so they would not intervene,” Moayedi said. This time, Moayedi was able to refer the woman to a private hospital.

3) Dr. Bhavik Kumar, an abortion provider at a stand-alone facility in Texas, said he recently safely performed an abortion for a patient whose placenta was in danger of growing into her caesarean-section scar. Another doctor had recommended the woman have her abortion in a hospital, but she said two hospitals—one that was part of a public hospital district, the other a faith-based nonprofit—refused to do the procedure. In New York, where he trained, Kumar said he “absolutely” would have referred this patient to a hospital. In Texas, he had no other option. “For this patient, the safest thing is for her to be not pregnant as soon as possible,” Kumar said.

2016 Guardian excerpts:

The woman inside the ambulance was miscarrying. That was clear from the foul-smelling fluid leaving her body. As the vehicle wailed toward the hospital, a doctor waiting for her arrival phoned a specialist, who was unequivocal: the baby would die. The woman might follow. Induce labor immediately.

But staff at the Mercy Health Partners hospital in Muskegon, Michigan would not induce labor for another 10 hours. Instead, they followed a set of directives written by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops that forbid terminating a pregnancy unless the mother is in grave condition. Doctors decided they would delay until the woman showed signs of sepsis – a life-threatening response to an advanced infection – or the fetal heart stopped on its own.

In the end, it was sepsis. When the woman delivered, at 1.41am, doctors had been watching her temperature climb for more than eight hours. Her infant lived for 65 minutes.

This story is just one example of how a single Catholic hospital risked the health of five different women [including Tamesha] in a span of 17 months, according to a new report leaked to the Guardian.

The women were all experiencing a rare pregnancy complication in which the membranes surrounding the fetus rupture too early. When that happens before the fetus is viable, the rupture leads to a miscarriage.

All five women, the report says, had symptoms indicating that it would be safest for them to deliver immediately. But instead of informing the women of their options, the report says, or offering to transfer them to a different hospital, doctors – apparently out of deference to the Mercy Health Partners’ strict ban on abortion – unilaterally decided to subject the women to prolonged miscarriages.

As a result, the report claims, several of the women suffered infection or emotional trauma, or had to undergo unnecessary surgery.

None of the women in the report were more than 20 weeks pregnant – which is several weeks before the fetus can survive outside the womb. And all five women showed signs of infection, the report says, such as an elevated temperature or heart rate.

One of the women described in the complaint was given Tylenol for a potentially deadly infection and sent home – twice – where she miscarried by herself on the toilet. Another woman, the report says, spent three days in the hospital and eventually required additional surgery.

Yet staff never informed any of the women that there was an alternative to natural miscarriage – immediate delivery – or that immediate delivery is a safer option for women showing signs of infection, the report says. One woman told Groesbeck that even when she asked medical staff to deliver her infant, they refused.

One woman arrived at the hospital after seeing a fetal limb in her toilet. Staff dilated her, causing “a bulging bag of waters”, but refused her request to break her water and begin delivery, the report says.

“The patient was forced to wait over eighteen hours, while dilated, to complete the miscarriage naturally, resulting in retention of the placenta (a leading cause of maternal hemorrhaging and death) and additional, and potentially unnecessary, surgical intervention to remove it,” the report says. Later, a test of the placenta was positive for infection.

Another woman arrived in the early stages of miscarriage with an elevated temperature and heart rate, the report says. After a natural miscarriage, that woman also required surgery to remove the placenta – which also tested positive for acute infection.

2016 ACLU excerpts:

1.    Maria (a pseudonym), a health care professional and mother of two in Washington State, was six to seven weeks along in her second pregnancy when she began experiencing heavy vaginal bleeding. She knew she was miscarrying and sought emergency care at the Catholic hospital where she was then working. Although she was aware of the hospital’s religious affiliation, her insurance coverage extended only to that hospital, and she could not afford thousands of dollars in costs to go elsewhere. Maria’s physician explained that the pregnancy was no longer viable and that her uterus needed to be evacuated in order to stop the bleeding. But, because the Directives prohibit an abortion if the fetus still has cardiac activity, her physician advised “expectant management,” i.e., waiting to see if Maria’s body would complete the miscarriage on its own.

The hospital staff delayed performing an abortion for hours while they attempted to verify through ultrasound that the fetus did not have a heartbeat, as required by the Directives. Finally, after seven hours, the hospital completed the miscarriage. By then, Maria’s iron levels were so low that she needed a blood transfusion. It was not without consequence. All blood transfusions carry risks, such as blood-borne infections and allergic reactions. But what happened to Maria was particularly dangerous. She was transfused with blood carrying Kell antigens and developed anti-Kell antibodies. Because her husband was Kell positive, this meant that their next pregnancy would be at risk for sudden fetal demise. When Maria became pregnant again several years later, she and her husband were terrified throughout that she would suddenly lose the pregnancy. Thankfully, their baby survived. But Maria and her family could have avoided significant emotional trauma if the Catholic hospital had provided her with the care she needed without hours of needless delay.

2.    Dr. Rupa Natarajan was working in a Catholic hospital in New England when she encountered a 19-year-old pregnant woman experiencing preterm premature rupture of membranes at 17 weeks. The pregnancy was doomed, and the patient was getting very sick, so Dr. Natarajan determined that the best course would be to perform an abortion. But the hospital prohibited her from doing so. The patient was admitted but not treated, and over the next day, her temperature and heart rate climbed. By the time Dr. Natarajan could arrange to have her transferred to another hospital to save her life, the patient’s fever had reached 104 degrees. (5-minute video of Dr. Natarajan discussing the case)

3.     Another OB-GYN on the East Coast recalled, “We had a woman experiencing preterm premature rupture of membranes at 16 weeks, but there was still a fetal heartbeat. The patient had to look into going elsewhere to get care because we weren’t permitted to deliver her. This puts a burden on the patient to go to a new doctor and have to relive everything [all] over again. Because of the delay in getting to another provider, the patient ended up delivering the [umbilical] cord at home—when the membranes rupture so early in pregnancy, sometimes the cord can be delivered first.

4.     Dr. David Eisenberg recalled that “the sickest patient I ever cared for during my residency” was a young woman denied care at a Catholic hospital outside of Chicago, Illinois. Her water had broken well before the fetus was viable, but the hospital refused to take steps to hasten delivery even though everyone knew the fetus could never survive. By the time she was transferred to Dr. Eisenberg’s hospital 10 days later, she had a fever of 106 degrees and was dying of sepsis. She survived, but she suffered an acute kidney injury requiring dialysis and a cognitive injury due to the severity of her sepsis. She spent nearly two weeks in the hospital before being transferred to a long-term care facility. “I clearly remember sitting in her ICU room after her [uterine] evacuation, wondering if she would make it through the night,” Dr. Eisenberg recalled. “To this day, I have never seen someone so sick—because we would never wait that long before evacuating the uterus. Expediting the delivery is the right thing to do in such situations, always regardless of the religious affiliation of the hospital.”

5.     Another OB-GYN told the ACLU about a patient she treated at a secular hospital in New England. The patient had previously been evaluated at a local Catholic hospital after she started bleeding around 12 weeks into her pregnancy. The Catholic hospital performed an ultrasound and found that the patient had an abnormal pregnancy “with placenta coming out of her cervix,” but because there was a fetal heartbeat, they told her she would have to wait. When the patient presented at this doctor’s hospital a week later, she was hemorrhaging and severely anemic from her blood loss over the past week. The medical team at the secular hospital performed emergency surgery and was just barely able to avoid the need for a hysterectomy—but the patient had to stay in the intensive care unit and needed transfusion of seven units of blood during her hospital stay. None of this would have been necessary had the Catholic hospital provided appropriate care when the patient first presented.

6.     Dr. Colleen Krajewski, an OB-GYN in Pennsylvania, recalled a patient whose water had broken at the very beginning of her second trimester. She went to the hospital closest to her, which happened to be Catholic. Although it was apparent to all that the (much desired) pregnancy had no chance of survival, the patient was left in a hospital bed for two days to passively wait for a spontaneous miscarriage. The patient was devastated that she was losing the pregnancy, and her trauma was compounded each time the hospital staff came to check if there was still a fetal heartbeat. The treating physicians petitioned the hospital’s ethics committee to intervene, but the request was denied. The patient was eventually transferred to Dr. Krajewski’s hospital, which provided the appropriate care. Dr. Krajewski observed, “the hours-long, middle-of-the-night transfer added to the patient’s experience of fear and abandonment.”

2013 ACLU excerpt:

In 2010, a woman who was 15-weeks pregnant with twins arrived at the Sierra Vista (Arizona) emergency department after miscarrying one of the twins at home. The remaining fetus had a heartbeat. The doctor who examined her recommended that the pregnancy be terminated, given the low chances of a successful pregnancy and the risks of attempting to continue the pregnancy, including severe hemorrhaging and infection. The physician recalled, “The patient and her husband were, of course, upset by the situation, but decided to proceed with the treatment.”

The physician and staff then began routine preparations to complete the miscarriage. But the hospital was subject to Catholic Directives. A hospital administrator intervened and ordered the physician to transfer the patient to avoid violating the Directive against abortion. The patient was sent by ambulance to another hospital 80 miles away where she received the care she needed.

“It was a very gut-wrenching thing to put the staff through [and to] put the patient through, obviously,” recalled the attending physician. Another obstetrician felt misled by the hospital administration. “We were told that we wouldn’t have a problem with dealing with miscarriages … and it turned out not to be true.”

2013 AJOB excerpt:

A patient presented to the emergency room at a Catholic hospital with a molar pregnancy, for which the standard care is evacuation of the uterus. It was a twin pregnancy, with one healthy-appearing baby and the other a typical mole. Dr. P told the patient what her risks were. “She didn’t want to carry the pregnancy further but by the time she reached that decision, she was about 16 weeks gestation. And she had vaginal bleeding so of course she now goes to the hospital … And then you can’t do anything while she’s there [in the Catholic hospital], you can’t help her end the pregnancy in a hospital setting that’s safer.”

The ethics committee refused permission to end the pregnancy. Another doctor, Dr. L., said: “The clergy who made the decision Googled molar pregnancy.” Based upon this search, ethics committee members ruled, “There’s a possibility that she could actually have a viable pregnancy [because] there have been cases where a child was born.” Thus, the ethics committee identified treatment of this molar pregnancy as equivalent to abortion. Dr. L. said: “They called it a termination, which is a bogus term because you’re not terminating anything but a horrible situation.”

The patient was transferred out for care, despite her bleeding, and despite the fact that terminating a bleeding molar pregnancy is safer in the hospital setting due to a high risk of hemorrhage.

2010 National Health Law Program excerpts:

1. Carla, who lives in eastern Oklahoma, thought she had the flu. Her family doctor referred her to an Obstetrician/Gynecologist (OB/GYN) who discovered she was pregnant and that she had a large mass growing on her uterus. Carla’s youngest child was already 16, and she decided to have an abortion, but when she went to the abortion clinic she was told that she needed to have the mass removed before she could have the abortion. Then her encounter with health care refusals began. The OB/GYN refused to remove the mass because it would endanger the pregnancy. The anesthesiologist in the practice group refused to give her any drugs that would harm the pregnancy. At this point the mass was shutting off her colon and bladder. Eventually Carla found a doctor an hour and a half away in another city, but due to the substantial delay, he had to remove her uterus, a procedure that would have been unnecessary if the abortion had been performed earlier in her pregnancy. Carla and her family were left with $40,000 in medical bills.

(NHLP reference: Story collected as part of the Heartland Abortion Regulation Project; PI Weitz, approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of California, San Francisco, #H11760-29203, data on file)

2. Dr. Smits was a physician at St. Mary’s hospital in a large Eastern city. The patient was 19 weeks pregnant and her membranes had ruptured. The fetus was not yet viable and the patient was septic as a result of PROM. Dr. Smits and the patient wanted to end the pregnancy to save the woman’s health, but the hospital ethics committee refused to approve the termination because the fetus still had a heartbeat. Dr. Smits was giving the woman medications to keep her blood pressure up and using a cooling blanket to keep her temperature down. As Dr. Smits said, “this woman was dying before our eyes.” And still the ethics committee refused to approve the termination. The patient was in ICU for ten days, and nearly died. The fetus died in utero. The woman had substantial internal bleeding, and developed pulmonary disease, resulting in lifetime oxygen dependency.

(NHLP reference: Freedman L. Willing and unable: doctors’ constraints in abortion care: University of California, Davis, Retrieved October 12, 2009 from Dissertations & Theses @ University of California. Publication No. AAT 3329612; 2009)

3. Dr. Brill described another doctor at the hospital at which he worked. The patient had placental abruption, where the placenta separates from the uterus and puts the patient at extreme risk for internal bleeding. If left untreated, the patient may need transfusions or even bleed to death. The treating physician was a “fundamental Christian.” The patient was 20 weeks pregnant. The physician refused to terminate the pregnancy. Instead he tried to stop the bleeding and to stop the labor. She continued to bleed. A week or two later, she spontaneously aborted, but not until she required several blood transfusions.

(NHLP reference: Freedman L. Willing and unable: doctors’ constraints in abortion care: University of California, Davis, Retrieved
October 12, 2009 from Dissertations & Theses @ University of California. Publication No. AAT 3329612; 2009.)

2008 American Journal of Public Health excerpts:

Intro: Obstetrician–gynecologists working in Catholic-owned hospitals described cases in which abortion was medically indicated according to their medical judgment but, because of the ethics committee’s ruling, it was delayed until either fetal heartbeats ceased or the patient could be transported to another facility. Dr P, from a midwestern, mid-sized city, said that at her Catholic-owned hospital, approval for termination of pregnancy was rare if a fetal heartbeat was present (even in “people who are bleeding, they’re all the way dilated, and they’re only 17 weeks”) unless “it looks like she’s going to die if we don’t do it.”

1.      In another case, Dr H, from the same Catholic-owned hospital in the Midwest, sent her patient by ambulance 90 miles to the nearest institution where the patient could have an abortion because the ethics committee refused to approve her case.

“She was very early, 14 weeks. She came in … and there was a hand sticking out of the cervix. Clearly the membranes had ruptured and she was trying to deliver… . There was a heart rate, and [we called] the ethics committee, and they [said], “Nope, can’t do anything.” So we had to send her to [the university hospital]… . You know, these things don’t happen that often, but from what I understand it, it’s pretty clear. Even if mom is very sick, you know, potentially life threatening, can’t do anything.”

2.      Dr B, an obstetrician–gynecologist working in an academic medical center, described how a Catholic-owned hospital in her western urban area asked her to accept a patient who was already septic. When she received the request, she recommended that the physician from the Catholic-owned hospital perform a uterine aspiration there and not further risk the health of the woman by delaying her care with the transport.

Because the fetus was still alive, they wouldn’t intervene. And she was hemorrhaging, and they called me and wanted to transport her, and I said, “It sounds like she’s unstable, and it sounds like you need to take care of her there.” And I was on a recorded line, I reported them as an EMTALA [Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act] violation. And the physician [said], “This isn’t something that we can take care of.” And I [said], “Well, if I don’t accept her, what are you going to do with her?” [He answered], “We’ll put her on a floor [i.e., admit her to a bed in the hospital instead of keeping her in the emergency room]; we’ll transfuse her as much as we can, and we’ll just wait till the fetus dies.”

Ultimately, Dr B chose to accept the patient to spare her unnecessary suffering and harm, but she saw this case as a form of “patient dumping,” because the patient was denied treatment and transported while unstable.

3.      Some doctors have decided to take matters into their own hands. In the following case, the refusal of the hospital ethics committee to approve uterine evacuation not only caused significant harm to the patient but compelled a perinatologist, Dr S, now practicing in a nonsectarian academic medical center, to violate protocol and resign from his position in an urban northeastern Catholic-owned hospital.

“I’ll never forget this; it was awful—I had one of my partners accept this patient at 19 weeks. The pregnancy was in the vagina. It was over… . And so he takes this patient and transferred her to [our] tertiary medical center, which I was just livid about, and, you know, “we’re going to save the pregnancy.” So of course, I’m on call when she gets septic, and she’s septic to the point that I’m pushing pressors on labor and delivery trying to keep her blood pressure up, and I have her on a cooling blanket because she’s 106 degrees. And I needed to get everything out. And so I put the ultrasound machine on and there was still a heartbeat, and [the ethics committee] wouldn’t let me because there was still a heartbeat. This woman is dying before our eyes. I went in to examine her, and I was able to find the umbilical cord through the membranes and just snapped the umbilical cord and so that I could put the ultrasound—“Oh look. No heartbeat. Let’s go.” She was so sick she was in the [intensive care unit] for about 10 days and very nearly died… . She was in DIC [disseminated intravascular coagulopathy]… . Her bleeding was so bad that the sclera, the white of her eyes, were red, filled with blood… . And I said, “I just can’t do this. I can’t put myself behind this. This is not worth it to me.” That’s why I left.”

From Dr S’s perspective, the chances for fetal life were nonexistent given the septic maternal environment. For the ethics committee, however, the present yet waning fetal heart tones were evidence of fetal life that precluded intervention. Rather than struggle longer to convince his committee to make an exception and grant approval for termination of pregnancy, Dr S chose to covertly sever the patient’s umbilical cord so that the fetal heartbeat would cease and evacuation of the uterus could “legitimately” proceed.

4.      Dr. G also circumvented the ethics committee in her southern Catholic-owned hospital. She opted not to check fetal heart tones or seek ethics committee approval when caring for a miscarrying woman for fear that documentation of fetal heart tones would have caused unnecessary delays. This led to conflict with the nurse assisting her.

“She was 14 weeks and the membranes were literally out of the cervix and hanging in the vagina. And so with her I could just take care of it in the [emergency room] but her cervix wasn’t open enough … so we went to the operating room and the nurse kept asking me, “Was there heart tones, was there heart tones?” I said “I don’t know. I don’t know.” Which I kind of knew there would be. But she said, “Well, did you check?” … I said, “I don’t need an ultrasound to tell me that it’s inevitable … you can just put, ‘The heart tones weren’t documented,’ and then they can interpret that however they want to interpret that.” … I said, “Throw it back at me … I’m not going to order an ultrasound. It’s silly.” Because then that’s the thing; it would have muddied the water in this case.”

Dr G’s main concern was sparing the patient extended suffering during loss of pregnancy. She disregarded the authority and protocol of the hospital ethics committee by not checking for fetal heart tones, which, she believed, would have led to significant delay in the inevitable treatment.

2007 report from JAMA:

A 35-year old woman in her 21st week of pregnancy presented to an emergency department in a hospital (possibly in Missouri) because she was miscarrying twins. Alhtough it was a much-wanted pregnancy and the staff spent two days trying to save the pregnancy, the fetal membranes continued to prolapse.

The woman and her husband (Dr. Ramesh Raghavan, the author of this JAMA article) decided to terminate after being informed of the major risk of infection, but were shocked when the hospital refused due to their strict policy against “elective” abortions. The woman had to be transported to a nearby university teaching hospital for life-saving treatment. Dr. Raghavan said: “This is why hospital policies that originate in religion rather than in science can be unhealthy and unsafe.”

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Introduction

This section contains abstracts or excerpts from the growing number of articles, by various authors, who generally agree that “conscientious objection” is harmful and inappropriate in health care.

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Izabela (2021) † Poland

Pregnant woman suffers loss of amniotic fluid, but dies of sepsis because doctors waited for fetus to die.

30-year-old Izabela died on Sep 22. She was 22 weeks pregnant, married with one daughter, and had been taken to hospital due to loss of amniotic fluid from her uterus. According to the family’s attorney Jolanta Budzowska, the doctors were either told to wait for the fetus to die or were afraid to do anything for the woman until the fetus had died. Izabela herself had sent text messages to her family about the doctors adopting a “wait and see” approach”. But as a result of this delay, Izabela died of septic shock.

Low amniotic fluid during pregnancy is a serious condition and can be life-threatening if not treated. Izabela’s fetus had already been diagnosed with a serious anomaly, which may have been why her amniotic fluid was low. It also sounds as if she lost whatever amniotic fluid there was in her uterus and was miscarrying. If so, her cervix must have been open, putting her at high risk for sepsis. All these are indications for emergency obstetric care – to prevent exactly what happened in the absence of treatment – septic shock followed very quickly by death. 

The hospital where Izabela died announced that all medical decisions were made taking into account the Polish law on the admissibility of termination of pregnancy.  They also claimed: “The only premise guiding the medical procedure was concern for the health and life of the patient and the fetus. Doctors and midwives did everything in their power, they fought a difficult fight for the patient and her child.”

The claim that nothing more could have been done is absurd. The pregnancy was no longer viable. Urgent removal of the fetus along with emergency treatment against septic shock was clinically indicated. This is standard emergency obstetric care.

The strict Polish law is not relevant, because the law allows abortion when a woman’s life is at risk. Nothing should have stopped the hospital from doing an immediate termination. Instead, it appears that Izabela’s death was caused by adherence to Catholic doctrine that prioritizes the life of the fetus over the woman – reminding us of the very similar death of Savita in Ireland in 2012.

Source: International Campaign for Safe Abortion, Nov 5, 2021, “Poland: death of a pregnant woman denied emergency obstetric care”

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Marta (2020) Spain

Miscarrying pregnant woman denied care at hospital, forced to go to private clinic while bleeding heavily

When Spanish doctor Marta Vigara was 17 weeks pregnant in December 2020, her waters broke and she quickly realised the prognosis for her pregnancy was “very bad”.  A geriatric specialist working at Madrid’s Clinico San Carlos hospital, she immediately went to her colleagues in the gynaecology department to have a therapeutic abortion. But no doctor would do it on grounds there was still “a foetal heartbeat”, directing her to a private clinic instead.

“I arrived at the clinic bleeding, probably because of a detached placenta,” she said. Vigara later learnt that the entire gynaecology unit at Clinico San Carlos had declared themselves “conscientious objectors” against abortion. She also said “When they send you away [to a private clinic], you feel a bit stigmatised as if you’re doing something wrong. I felt very guilty and very miserable.”

Source: France24.com, In Spain, abortions legal but barriers remain

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(Nov 2020) How to Reduce or Eliminate “Conscientious Objection” in Reproductive Health Care

November 1, 2020

By Joyce Arthur and Christian Fiala

Working towards an eventual ban on so-called “conscientious objection” in reproductive health care is not only the right thing to do, but also would be more achievable than trying to accommodate and regulate the practice on an ongoing basis – which has not been proven to work in any country.

Empirically-based criteria for reducing the number of objectors over time can be developed that would be ethical and fair to all parties. This paper suggests ideas for incrementally reducing or eliminating belief-based treatment refusals in reproductive health care.

Access document here (3 pages, PDF): How to Reduce or Eliminate “Conscientious Objection” in Reproductive Health Care


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(2020) Beyond Money: Conscientious Objection in Medicine as a Conflict of Interest

Alberto Giubilini & Julian Savulescu

Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, Vol 17, pgs 229–243 (May 2020)

Abstract

Conflict of interests (COIs) in medicine are typically taken to be financial in nature: it is often assumed that a COI occurs when a healthcare practitioner’s financial interest conflicts with patients’ interests, public health interests, or professional obligations more generally. Even when non-financial COIs are acknowledged, ethical concerns are almost exclusively reserved for financial COIs. However, the notion of “interests” cannot be reduced to its financial component. Individuals in general, and medical professionals in particular, have different types of interests, many of which are non-financial in nature but can still conflict with professional obligations. The debate about healthcare delivery has largely overlooked this broader notion of interests. Here, we will focus on health practitioners’ moral or religious values as particular types of personal interests involved in healthcare delivery that can generate COIs and on conscientious objection in healthcare as the expression of a particular type of COI. We argue that, in the healthcare context, the COIs generated by interests of conscience can be as ethically problematic, and therefore should be treated in the same way, as financial COIs.

Relevant Excerpt (from Conclusion)

If we frame conscientious objection as the expression of a conflict of interest in health care, then it is apparent how at the moment conscientious objection is treated and managed differently from the way other conflicts of interest are treated, and for no apparent good reason. Allowing conscientious objection to certain practices means not only acknowledging that a conflict of interest exists (because we are acknowledging that the health care professional has personal goals and motivations that conflict with professional obligations) and that the conflict is ethically impermissible (because we are acknowledging the professional’s personal goals and motivations prevent them from fulfilling their professional obligations). It also means allowing the conflict of interest to take place and to affect professional conduct when we do not allow the same to happen in the case of FCOIs. This differential treatment is not ethically justified, or so we have argued.

Source: Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (open access)

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(May 2020) The inequity of conscientious objection: Refusal of emergency contraception

Chelsey Yang, May 13, 2020, Nursing Ethics, 27:6; 1408-1417.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0969733020918926

Abstract

In the medical field, conscientious objection is claimed by providers and pharmacists in an attempt to forgo administering select forms of sexual and reproductive healthcare services because they state it goes against their moral integrity. Such claim of conscientious objection may include refusing to administer emergency contraception to an individual with a medical need that is time-sensitive. Conscientious objection is first defined, and then a historical context is provided on the medical field’s involvement with the issue. An explanation of emergency contraception’s physiological effects is provided along with historical context of the use on emergency contraception in terms of United States Law. A comparison is given between the United States and other developed countries in regard to conscientious objection. Once an understanding of conscientious objection and emergency contraception is presented, arguments supporting and contradicting the claim are described. Opinions supporting conscientious objection include the support of moral integrity, religious diversity, and less regulation on government involvement in state law will be offered. Finally, arguments against the effects of conscientious objection with emergency contraception are explained in terms of financial implications and other repercussions for people in lower socioeconomic status groups, especially people of color. Although every clinician has the right and responsibility to treat according to their sense of responsibility or conscience, the ethical consequences of living by one’s conscience are limiting and negatively impact underprivileged groups of people. It is the aim of this article to advocate against the use of provider’s and pharmacist’s right to claim conscientious objection due to the inequitable impact the practice has on people of color and individuals with lower incomes.

Source: Nursing Ethics

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(2020) Implementing the liberalized abortion law in Kigali, Rwanda: Ambiguities of rights and responsibilities among health care providers

Jessica Påfs, Stephen Rulisa, Marie Klingberg-Allvin, Pauline Binder-Finnema, Aimable Musafili, Birgitta Essén et al
January 2020
Midwifery, Vol 80, 102568

Partial Abstract

Objective: Rwanda amended its abortions law in 2012 to allow for induced abortion under certain circumstances. We explore how Rwandan health care providers (HCP) understand the law and implement it in their clinical practice.

Findings: HCPs express ambiguities on their rights and responsibilities when providing abortion care. A prominent finding was the uncertainties about the legal status of abortion, indicating that HCPs may rely on outdated regulations. A reluctance to be identified as an abortion provider was noticeable due to fear of occupational stigma. The dilemma of liability and litigation was present, and particularly care providers’ legal responsibility on whether to report a woman who discloses an illegal abortion.

Conclusion: The lack of professional consensus is creating barriers to the realization of safe abortion care within the legal framework, and challenge patients right for confidentiality. This bring consequences on girl’s and women’s reproductive health in the setting. To implement the amended abortion law and to provide equitable maternal care, the clinical and ethical guidelines for HCPs need to be revisited.

Relevant Excerpt

Our findings point at a lack of professional consensus when consulting persons seeking advice or care for an unwanted pregnancy. The HCPs consult women differently depending on their personal values and interpretation of the law. This bring thoughts to the ‘Professional Code of Ethics’ as nurses and midwives have the right to “refuse to participate in activities contrary to his/her personal moral and professional convictions.” (Rwanda Ministry of Health 2009). This is an issue raised within reproductive health care, as the allowance for personal values among HCPs leads to an inequitable provision of care (Rehnström Loi et al., 2015 ; Fiala and Arthur, 2014). For physicians, the ethical guidelines do state that it is in their duty to provide abortion within the law ( Rwanda Ministry of Health 2009 ), in line with what one of the participants said. Yet, the physicians in our study also claimed they lack proper training to implement this in practice. This argument of not possessing the skills needed may though be a cover up for their actual attitudes of not being willing to provide abortion services. Similar reasoning has been seen among nurses and midwives in other sub- Saharan countries (Rehnström Loi et al., 2015). The lack of skills cannot be an acceptable argument anymore, given the possibility of medical abortions, that can be carried out by midlevel providers and women themselves and are in line with WHOs recommendations (Klingberg-Allvin et al., 2015; Cleeve et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2019). Not only could such task-shifting significantly reduce cur rent costs of PAC and diminish current workload of health care providers in Rwanda (Vlassoffet al., 2015) – it may also facilitate for HCPs in their ethical dilemma seen in our findings. However, HCPs attitudes play an important role in the implementation of task-shifting (Kim et al., 2019). Additionally, our findings highlight the concern of stigma connected to the implementation and usage of Misoprostol in the clinical practice. The controversial status of Misoprostol is worthy of attention. This does not only have implications for abortion-related care, but also for the quality of maternal health care.

Source: Midwivery

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Leticia (2019) – Argentina 

Woman pregnant from rape denied abortion, does self-abortion and almost bleeds to death because treatment delayed due to judgment

In September 2019, Leticia H. (a pseudonym), 19, went to a public hospital in northern Argentina to end a pregnancy caused by rape. She was 17 weeks pregnant. The hospital denied the abortion, citing an informal rule under which the hospital provided abortions only up to 16 weeks. The rule lacked a legal basis.

Leticia took medication to induce an abortion, said a lawyer involved in the case, but the abortion was incomplete; tissue remaining in her uterus placed her at risk of infection. Recognizing that something was wrong and that she needed medical intervention, Leticia went to a hospital, where health personnel left her waiting for two hours before treating her. Bleeding profusely, she lost consciousness several times in the emergency room corridor. “If you liked having an abortion,” a hospital employee told her, “you’ll now have to wait.”

Source: Human Rights Watch. Aug 31, 2020. Argentina: Legalize Abortion: End Insurmountable Barriers.

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“Conscientious Objection” in Croatia

Conscience-based refusal in reproductive medicine

by Sanja Cesar
Published 2017

Abstract (shortened and edited) This paper explains the legal principle of conscience-based refusal in reproductive medicine; analyses legislation, politics, and practice regarding refusal of health care services provision on conscientious grounds in the Republic of Croatia; and indicates the problems in legislation and practice that enable malpractice of this right, thus violating the right of each patient to access lawful medical care in a timely manner.

The Republic of Croatia does not have a uniform and standardized procedure of refusing to provide relevant services for reasons of personal conscience, and there is no systematic data collection on professionals’ refusals to provide standard reproductive services, or its effect on the quality of health care. Lack of monitoring from the Ministry of Health and tolerance for institutionalized conscience-based refusal represent a public health problem that ultimately results in limited access as well as legal and medical insecurity for women. Women who request abortion are stigmatized in society, are faced with disapproval or humiliation in health care facilities, and can also be exposed to unnecessary waiting periods, additional costs, and discrimination.

Read full report: Conscience-based refusal in reproductive medicine

 


A Look at Conscientious Objection in Croatia

By Amir Hodžić
Apr 25, 2016

For a country sometimes deemed “the most Catholic country in Europe,” abortion is relatively available in Croatia. Terminations are accessible upon request within the first 10 weeks of pregnancy, and under several conditions after that in this 86 percent Catholic nation. But over the last few years, a growing number of gynecologists have been invoking conscientious objection (CO) in their refusal to perform an abortion. This uptick in the practice of CO should be seen as a coordinated, collective action that aims to challenge liberal laws and policies on sexual and reproductive health—part of a larger conservative agenda in this country struggling to balance competing rights claims.

We can say that Croatia has failed to comprehensively and effectively regulate the practice of CO and thus allowed the denial of reproductive healthcare services to many women. In the last couple of years, we have witnessed the extensive promotion and co-option of the term CO by religiously affiliated groups on the political right aiming to deny women’s right to health and life—disguised as respect for clinicians’ “right” of conscience.

Read full article: Conscience Magazine

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Lucia (2019) – Argentina

11-year old rape victim denied abortion and forced to give birth by C-section

“Lucia”, an 11-year-old victim of rape by her grandmother’s 65-year old partner was forced to gave birth in the province of Tucumán, Argentina on Feb 26, 2019, after she was denied an abortion by authorities and doctors for nearly five weeks. Lucia and her mother had repeatedly asked for an abortion during this time, but were repeatedly refused and delayed.  The girl had begged officials to “remove what the old man put inside me.” Abortion is legal in Argentina in cases of rape, when the woman is mentally disabled, or if there is a serious risk to her health. Lucia clearly qualified for a legal abortion on two of these grounds, since her small size made carrying a pregnancy very risky.

Lucia also had attempted to commit suicide twice upon learning of her pregnancy in late January. She was hospitalized as a result of apparent self-inflicted lesions. A constant stream of people, including a priest and government officials, came to the hospital in February to coerce Lucía into giving birth. The priest even tried to bribe Lucia’s mother by offering to buy the infant from her.

In her 23rd week of pregnancy, a court order was issued granting permission for Lucia’s abortion, even though court intervention is not required under the law. But several doctors at Eva Perón Hospital refused to perform the abortion, exercising their “right” to conscientious objection.  Two other doctors stepped in and performed a “micro” C-section, deciding an abortion was too risky for the girl because of her small size and the fact she was suffering from hypertension. (The baby was extracted alive but died 10 days later.) The two doctors who did the C-section were angry at the politicization of Lucia’s case.

Women’s rights activists also cited political reasons for the systemic violation of the girl’s rights, because Tucumán’s governor, Juan Manzur, used Lucia to push a political agenda. The provincial Secretary of Health, Gustavo Vigliocco, claimed to be personally involved and that the girl wanted to continue the pregnancy, also falsely claiming he himself “cannot not make any decision.” A doctor who performed the C-section, Dr. Cecilia Ousset, said: “We saved the life of an 11-year-old girl who was tortured for a month by the provincial health system. For electoral reasons they [the authorities] prevented the legal interruption of the pregnancy and forced the little girl to give birth.” Feminist activist Mariana Carbajal said the government treated Lucia “like a receptacle, like an incubator.”

As of April 2019, multiple cases are being prepared on behalf of Lucía and her family. Soledad Deza, an attorney at Catholics for the Right to Decide, has called on the state to investigate the provincial health minister, the head of the healthcare system, the director of the Eva Perón hospital, and Lucía’s doctor at the hospital, for participating in “a chain of obstruction and barriers to delay” the abortion. The family wants them to be convicted of their crimes.

Read full articles:

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Carmela (2018) – Argentina

Woman with anencephalic pregnancy denied abortion with forced birth at 7 months gestation

In November 2018, Carmela Toledo, 23, found out that she was carrying a fetus with anencephaly, a condition that makes it difficult for the fetus to survive. Carmela was 25 weeks pregnant. She went to a public hospital in Buenos Aires province to request a legal abortion, but doctors told her that the bill decriminalizing abortion had not passed and added, falsely, that abortion was completely illegal. They said she had to wait until she was seven months pregnant, so they could say she had had a premature birth.

When she was seven months pregnant, health professionals tried unsuccessfully to induce birth. The doctor involved frightened Carmela by outlining the risks of the procedure, including the possibility of difficulties in having a child later. She decided to continue the pregnancy, and whenever she felt the fetus move, she cried. She had a caesarean section at week 41 and delivered a daughter who died eight days later.

Source: Human Rights Watch. Aug 31, 2020. Argentina: Legalize Abortion: End Insurmountable Barriers.

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(Aug 2018) Lessons learnt from the past: “Conscientious objection” to abortion in Chile will lead to widespread disobedience of the new law

August 6, 2018

By Christian Fiala and Joyce H Arthur

Authors Montero and Villarroel discuss problems that might arise from “conscientious objection” (CO) to the new law in Chile that legalized abortion in cases of life endangerment of the woman, fatal fetal abnormality, and rape. (“A critical review of conscientious objection and decriminalisation of abortion in Chile”, Jan 6). The law provides the “right” to exercise CO, with the only caveat that health institutions are required to immediately refer patients to non-objecting practitioners. We share the authors’ concerns that conscientious objection may prove be quite widespread in Chile with the new law. In fact, we argue it will create serious, widespread problems for access to safe and legal abortion, despite the referral requirement.

Read full response: BMJ Journal of Medical Ethics

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(Aug 2018) On the Revolutionary Road to Reproductive Justice

by Michelle Truong, International Women’s Health Coalition
August 6, 2018

Dr. Willie Parker is an abortion provider because of, not despite, his Christian faith. At a moment when refusal of care due to conscience claims obstructs reproductive justice, emphasizing the role conscience plays in compassionate and ethical medical care, as Dr. Parker does, means a revolutionary shift in thinking about power—prioritizing the needs of the woman seeking care.

The use of conscience claims to deny health care services is a focal point in current debates on abortion access and was a central issue at the recent Abortion and Reproductive Justice Conference (ARJC) in South Africa. In an auspicious start to the ARJC, the host-city, formerly known as Grahamstown, had recently voted to discard the name of Graham, a brutal colonizer, to rename in honor of Makhanda, a Xhosa freedom fighter and philosopher.

Source: Read article

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(July 2018) Religious Refusals and Reproductive Rights: Claims of Conscience as Discrimination and Shaming

By Louise Melling

Chapter 14 – Religious Refusals and Reproductive Rights, from Part IV – Conscience, Accommodation and Its Harms. Edited by Susanna Mancini, Università di Bologna, Michel Rosenfeld. Publisher: Cambridge University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316780053.015

Relevant excerpt:

The stories from Indiana and Arizona illustrate the different way in which we currently view refusals to serve LGBT people for reasons of religious beliefs versus refusals to serve women seeking reproductive health services because of religious beliefs. This chapter takes issue with this difference. It argues we need to see, question, and protest the harms that result when women seeking services related to contraception and abortion are turned away for reasons of faith as robustly as we question the harms when LGBT people are refused service because of religious beliefs.14 It asks that we see these refusals as discrimination too.

In making this call for change, this chapter first puts the current debate in the United States about religious refusals in context; second, it posits parallels between the harm to women turned away for wanting to control their fertility and to same-sex couples denied services for their weddings; third, this chapter offers an account for why refusals to provide services because of religious beliefs are treated differently in the two contexts; and finally, it argues that how we think about religious objections to serving those seeking abortion and contraception matters for women’s equality. This chapter does not purport to put forward a definitive argument; it aims instead to make a case for questioning a long-standing norm.

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(July 2018) Seeking to Square the Circle: A Sustainable Conscientious Objection in Reproductive Healthcare

Emmanuelle Bribosia and Isabelle Rorive

Chapter 15 in: The Conscience Wars: Rethinking the Balance between Religion, Identity, and Equality, ed. Susanna Mancini and Michel Rosenfeld (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018) pp. 392-413.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316780053.016

From Book Introduction:

[In this chapter, the authors] focus on the practical and conceptual difficulties in reconciling the reproductive rights of women with the conscience claims of individual health care providers. From a practical standpoint, drawing on national, international, and European measures, cases, and policy papers, they demonstrate that even the most balanced regulatory framework of conscientious objection fails to overcome the strength of the web of religious and patriarchal structures of society, in which women are still caught. This results in a distortion of religious exemption clauses to the detriment of women’s rights.

From a conceptual standpoint, Bribosia and Rorive … maintain that conscience clauses involve not only direct harm to women who wish to access abortion services but also dignitary and symbolic harm. In this light, conscientious objection places the medical doctor in the position of exercising personal power over the patient by imposing his or her beliefs, and that per se constitutes a violation of women’s dignity and equality. In the end, according to Bribosia and Rorive, access to abortion is not enough to protect women from discrimination: what is required is access to health care on an equal footing, without any moral judgment by an authority.

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(July 2018) IWHC Brief to Constitutional Court of Colombia: Abortion Restrictions are Ineffective and Harmful

New York City, United States, 18 July 2018
To: Señora Magistrada CRISTINA PARDO SCHLESINGER, Corte Constitucional, E.S.D.

The International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC) submitted an amicus brief to the Constitutional Court of Colombia, urging the court to defend women’s rights and health by upholding the right to safe and legal abortion. In October 2018, the court voted 6 to 3 to maintain no time frame restriction on legal abortion, denying a request to limit abortion to the first 24 weeks of pregnancy.

Excerpt: Research into the experiences of women confronted with the denial of abortion indicates that they face an increased risk of physical and psychological harm, socioeconomic disadvantage, and even shortened lifespans. In August 2017, IWHC, in conjunction with Mujer y Salud en Uruguay, organized the Convening on Conscientious Objection: Strategies to Counter the Effects, in which 45 participants from 22 countries discussed the consequences of denial of sexual and reproductive health care and shared data from their home countries. Convening participants who work at the community level recounted experiences of women who have suffered the negative effects of conscience claims.

Source: Read brief

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(July 2018) Provider Conscientious Refusal, Medical Malpractice, and the Right to Civil Recourse

by Jane A. Hartsock

American Journal of Bioethics, 18:7, 66-68
DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2018.1478020

Nelson (2018) argues that where death results from conscientious refusal to provide abortion services in an obstetrical emergency, clinicians and institutions should be held criminally liable for homicide. I wholeheartedly endorse Nelson’s position and add the following additional observations: (1) Clinicians and institutions that decline to provide reproductive health care in accordance with generally accepted standards of care are civilly liable for professional and institutional negligence; (2) state statutes that attempt to obviate clinician and institutional duties to comply with the standard of care violate the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and similar federal statutes violate the 5th and 7th Amendments; and (3) the preceding analysis holds true with respect to a wide range of women’s health care services in addition to abortion, including access to medically indicated birth
control and sterilization, and care and treatment of female survivors of sexual assault, to name just a few in this short response. There appears to be exceedingly little literature exploring this issue, and even less case law, but the 2016 case of Tamesha Means v. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops provides some insight and direction into what such a case might look like.

Source: Read article: American Journal of Bioethics

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(July 2018) Enforcing Conscientious Objection to Abortion in Medical Emergency Circumstances: Criminal and Unethical

by Udo Schuklenk & Benjamin Zolf

American Journal of Bioethics, 18:7, 60-61
DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2018.1478036

Lawrence Nelson discusses cases in which abortion is necessary due to a life-threatening medical emergency. He argues that under American law, health care pro-
viders who conscientiously refuse to perform one in such circumstances are guilty of murder or reckless homicide, if the woman dies as a result of their refusal. A criminal homicide conviction requires an established standard of care that goes unmet, combined with a causal link between the failure to meet that standard and the death that eventuates (Nelson 2018). Physicians and hospitals uncontroversially have a legal duty to care for their patients. If their refusal to render that care causes someone’s death, they seem to clearly meet the criteria for criminal homicide. Nelson shows that this fact cannot be mitigated by claims about earnest moral intentions, or the right to free exercise of religion (Nelson 2018). He contends that expert medical witnesses would establish in court that physicians faced with emergency circumstances have a duty to provide medically necessary care, regardless of their conscientious beliefs. Finally, he argues that statutes exempting physicians from providing abortions in emergencies (which exist in a staggering 45 U.S. states) are unconstitutional.

Read full article: American Journal of Bioethics

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(July 2018) Being a Doctor and Being a Hospital

Rosamond Rhodes & Michael Danziger
The American Journal of Bioethics, 18:7, 51-53
Doi: 10.1080/15265161.2018.1478021

In his excellent piece, “Provider Conscientious Refusal of Abortion, Obstetrical Emergencies, and Criminal Homicide Law,” Lawrence Nelson makes a compelling legal argument against physicians’ refusal to provide life-saving abortions (Nelson 2018). We want to make the equivalent moral argument. Nelson says that physicians who refuse to perform abortions are violating the “legal duty to treat the woman,” but he suggests that they may be “honoring a moral duty not to kill a fetus.” We take issue with that suggestion. Instead, we maintain that just as a physician who refuses to provide abortion violates a legal duty, that physician violates a moral duty as well.

Abstract and excerpt: American Journal of Bioethics

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(July 2018) No conscientious objection without normative justification: Against conscientious objection in medicine

by Benjamin Zolf, Bioethics. DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12521  

Abstract

Most proponents of conscientious objection accommodation in medicine acknowledge that not all conscientious beliefs can justify refusing service to a patient. Accordingly, they admit that constraints must be placed on the practice of conscientious objection. I argue that one such constraint must be an assessment of the reasonability of the conscientious claim in question, and that this requires normative justification of the claim. Some advocates of conscientious object protest that, since conscientious claims are a manifestation of personal beliefs, they cannot be subject to this kind of public justification. In order to preserve an element of constraint without requiring normative justification of conscientious beliefs, they shift the justificatory burden from the belief motivating the conscientious claim to the condition of the patient being refused service. This generally involves a claim along the lines that conscientious refusals should be permitted to the extent that they do not cause unwarranted harm to the patient. I argue that explaining what would constitute warranted harm requires an explanation of what it is about the conscientious claim that makes the harm warranted. ‘Warranted’ is a normative operator, and providing this explanation is the same as providing normative justification for the conscientious claim. This shows that resorting to facts about the patient’s condition does not avoid the problem of providing normative justification, and that the onus remains on advocates of conscientious objection to provide normative justification for the practice in the context of medical care.

Source: Bioethics

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Origin and meaning of ‘‘conscientious objection’’

Conscientious objection (CO) in the West originates in Christianity in the form of pacifism — the belief that taking human life under any circumstances is evil (Moskos and Whiteclay Chambers, 1993). Although all conscientious objectors take their position on the basis of conscience, they may have varying religious, philosophical, or political reasons for their beliefs.

The original expression of conscientious objection was the refusal to perform mandatory military service because of personal or religious moral objections to killing. However, in recent years, the concept has been used by some in the medical profession to refuse to provide services with which they personally disagree, such as euthanasia, abortion, contraception, sterilization, assisted reproduction, and other health services — even when these services are legal and within the scope of their qualifications and practice. In particular, the Catholic Church and the anti-choice movement have co-opted the term ‘‘conscientious objection’’ to include the refusal by medical personnel to provide or refer for abortion (and increasingly, contraception), on the grounds that abortion is murder and that actions to oppose it are imperative. As the late Pope John Paul II said (Pope John Paul II, 1995): “Abortion and euthanasia are thus crimes which no human law can claim to legitimize. There is no obligation in conscience to obey such laws; instead there is a grave and clear obligation to oppose them by conscientious objection.”

Reproductive health is the only field in medicine where societies worldwide accept freedom of conscience as an argument to limit a patient‘s right to a legal medical treatment. However, CO in medicine is still largely unregulated across Europe (as in the rest of the world) and abuses remain systemic (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2010).

Source: Fiala C, Arthur JH. ‘‘Dishonourable disobedience’’ — Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection. Woman – Psychosom Gynaecol Obstet (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.woman.2014.03.001

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CO in United States


Is Your Health Care Compromised?
How the Catholic Directives Make for Unhealthy Choices

CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE
2017

At a time in US history when healthcare can be challenging to access even by those with good insurance coverage, how is it possible to say that Catholic healthcare can be bad for your health? This report will answer that question by showing how the religious rules followed by such institutions take precedence over your health needs and wishes. There are prohibitions on abortion — even for miscarriage management, restrictions on provision of in vitro fertilization to
help women struggling with infertility and for ectopic pregnancies, bans on modern contraceptive methods including sterilization and often an unwillingness to honor advance medical directives. This would be less egregious if it were clear that a hospital is Catholic-owned, but that is not necessarily the case. You may find yourself in a hospital you’ve used for decades that only recently merged with a Catholic healthcare institution, and options you had once exercised are no longer available to you. Between 2001 and 2016, the number of hospitals affiliated with the Catholic church increased by 22 percent. Do you know if your local hospital is one of them? And how do you feel about your healthcare being guided by the bishops’ interpretation of the Catholic faith, rather than by medical necessity or your own religious beliefs?

Read full report: Catholics for Choice


 

Health Care Denied
Patients and Physicians Speak Out About Catholic Hospitals and the Threat to Women’s Health and Lives

Apr 26, 2016

One in six hospital beds in the U.S. is in a facility that complies with Catholic directives that prohibit a range of reproductive health care services, even when a woman’s life or health is in jeopardy. In some states, more than 40 percent of all hospital beds are in a Catholic-run facility, leaving entire regions without any option for certain reproductive health care services. The ACLU’s report shares firsthand accounts from patients who have been denied appropriate care at Catholic hospitals, from health care providers forbidden from providing critical care because of the Directives, and from physicians at secular hospitals who have treated very sick women after they were turned away from a Catholic facility.

The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, which are promulgated by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, set forth standards for the provision of care at Catholic health care facilities. The Directives prohibit a range of reproductive health services, including contraception, sterilization, many infertility treatments, and abortion, even when a woman’s life or health is jeopardized by a pregnancy. Because of these rules, many Catholic hospitals across this country are withholding emergency care from patients who are in the midst of a miscarriage or experiencing other pregnancy complications. Catholic hospitals also routinely prohibit doctors from performing tubal ligations (commonly known as “getting your tubes tied”) at the time of delivery, when the procedure is safest, leaving patients to undergo an additional surgery elsewhere after recovering from childbirth. Catholic hospitals deny these essential health services despite receiving billions in taxpayer dollars. Transgender and gender-non-conforming patients suffer the same and other, similar harms when seeking reproductive health care.

Read full report: ACLU

 


 

Conflicts in Care for Obstetric Complications in Catholic Hospitals

Lori R. Freedman & Debra B. Stulberg
18 Dec 2012
AJOB Primary Research, Volume 4, 2013 – Issue 4, Pages 1-10
https://doi.org/10.1080/21507716.2012.751464

Abstract

Background: A recent national survey revealed that over half of obstetrician-gynecologists working in Catholic hospitals have conflicts with religious policies, but the survey did not elucidate the nature of the conflicts. Our qualitative study examines the nature of physician conflicts with religious policies governing obstetrician-gynecologist (ob-gyn) care. Results related to restrictions on the management of obstetric complications are reported here.

Methods: In-depth interviews lasting about one hour were conducted with obstetrician-gynecologists throughout the United States. Questions focused on physicians’ general satisfaction with their hospital work settings and specific experiences with religious doctrine-based ob-gyn policies in the various hospitals where they have worked.

Results: Conflicts reported here include cases in which Catholic hospital religious policy (Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services) impacted physicians’ abilities to offer treatment to women experiencing certain obstetric emergencies, such as pregnancy-related health problems, molar pregnancy, miscarriage, or previable premature rupture of membranes (PPROM), because hospital authorities perceived treatment as equivalent to a prohibited abortion. Physicians were contractually obligated to follow doctrine-based policies while practicing in these Catholic hospitals.

Conclusions: For some physicians, their hospital’s prohibition on abortion initially seemed congruent with their own principles, but when applied to cases in which patients were already losing a desired pregnancy and/or the patient’s health was at risk, some physicians found the institutional restrictions on care to be unacceptable.

Read full study: ACLU

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CO in Norway

Conscientious objection to referrals for abortion: pragmatic solution or threat to women’s rights?

Eva M Kibsgaard Nordberg, Helge Skirbekk and Morten Magelssen
BMC Medical Ethics
Feb 26, 2014
https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6939-15-15

Abstract

Background: Conscientious objection has spurred impassioned debate in many Western countries. Some Norwegian general practitioners (GPs) refuse to refer for abortion. Little is know about how the GPs carry out their refusals in practice, how they perceive their refusal to fit with their role as professionals, and how refusals impact patients. Empirical data can inform subsequent normative analysis.

Methods: Qualitative research interviews were conducted with seven GPs, all Christians. Transcripts were analysed using systematic text condensation.

Results: Informants displayed a marked ambivalence towards their own refusal practices. Five main topics emerged in the interviews: 1) carrying out conscientious objection in practice, 2) justification for conscientious objection, 3) challenges when relating to colleagues, 4) ambivalence and consistency, 5) effects on the doctor-patient relationship.

Conclusions: Norwegian GP conscientious objectors were given to consider both pros and cons when evaluating their refusal practices. They had settled on a practical compromise, the precise form of which would vary, and which was deemed an acceptable middle way between competing interests.

Read full study: BMC Medical Ethics

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CO in Canada

The Refusal to Provide Health Care in Canada

A Look at “Conscientious Objection” Policies in Canadian Health Care
June 2018

Many people may be unaware that in Canada, doctors have the “right” to refuse to provide legal and necessary treatments for personal or religious reasons. Further, doctors usually don’t even have to refer patients to someone who can provide the objected-to service. This permitted abandonment of patients is not monitored and there are rarely any repercussions for doctors who may cause harm to patients as a result.

This paper explains why so-called “conscientious objection” in health care is unethical and unworkable and has nothing in common with true conscientious objection in the military.

Source: Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada


Canadian Policies and Laws on “Conscientious Objection” in Health Care

June 2018

This Appendix [to the above paper] describes and critiques the policies of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) and each College of Physicians and Surgeons across Canada as they relate to the refusal to treat and obligation to refer , in particular for abortion care, but also medical assistance in dying (MAiD). The three territories do not have Colleges and their policies if any were not reviewed.

Source: Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada


Welcome to the wild, wild north: conscientious objection policies governing Canada’s medical, nursing, pharmacy, and dental professions.

Jacquelyn Shaw and Jocelyn Downie
Bioethics. 2014 Jan;28(1):33-46
doi: 10.1111/bioe.12057

Abstract

In Canada, as in many developed countries, healthcare conscientious objection is growing in visibility, if not in incidence. Yet the country’s health professional policies on conscientious objection are in disarray. The article reports the results of a comprehensive review of policies relevant to conscientious objection for four Canadian health professions: medicine, nursing, pharmacy and dentistry. Where relevant policies exist in many Canadian provinces, there is much controversy and potential for confusion, due to policy inconsistencies and terminological vagueness. Meanwhile, in Canada’s three most northerly territories with significant Aboriginal populations, whose already precarious health is influenced by funding and practitioner shortages, there are major policy gaps applicable to conscientious objection. In many parts of the country, as a result of health professionals’ conscientious refusals, access to some legal health services – including but not limited to reproductive health services such as abortion – has been seriously impeded. Although policy reform on conscientious conflicts may be difficult, and may generate strenuous opposition from some professional groups, for the sake of both patients and providers, such policy change must become an urgent priority.

Source: Bioethics

 

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Conscientious Objection in Latin America

How ‘conscientious objectors’ threaten women’s newly-won abortion rights in Latin America
From Uruguay to Chile, medical staff are refusing to provide abortion services even after their legalisation.

Diana Cariboni
18 July 2018

Women’s rights to legal abortion have increased in Latin America – but so have campaigns and policies for medical staff to be able to ‘conscientiously object’ and refuse to participate in these procedures.

“We didn’t see it coming,” said feminist activist Lilián Abracinskas in Uruguay, a secular country where abortion, same-sex marriage and the marijuana market were each legalised in the last decade.

Read full article: Open Democracy


 

Refusing Reproductive Health Services on Grounds of Conscience in Latin America

Diya Uberoi and Beatriz Galli
Nov 2016

Challenging policies and practises based on human rights standards

The years have seen a rise in the use of conscientious objection (CO) as means to deny women their sexual reproductive health rights. While states have an obligation under international human rights law to protect the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of people, they also have obligations to protect the right to the highest attainable standard of health and other fundamental rights. Over the years, International and regional human rights bodies have indicated the need for CO to be limited so as to protect women’s rights.

As a means to balance both rights of medical service providers to exercise their moral beliefs and to protect the right to health of women, countries around the world have also sought different ways to regulate the use of CO. Whereas in some countries, some developments have been made to regulate CO so as to protect fundamental rights of women, in others, few guidelines exist in order to ensure availability of services for women in case refusals are made. This article provides an overview of policies regulating CO in Latin America. It considers the regulation of CO under both international law and under various state laws within the region. It suggests that if women’s reproductive rights are to become a reality, then there is a real need that states as well as international and regional human rights bodies continue to find ways to clarify frameworks around CO, so that grounds of conscience do not become an excuse to deny women realisation of their fundamental rights.

Read full article: SurConnectas

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Abuse of CO

Once the basic principle of CO is accepted in reproductive healthcare, it becomes impossible to control or limit. Who will be in charge of deciding? Where does it stop? What criteria will determine the limits? Who will enforce it? And what are the sanctions? Currently, legal provisions for CO are routinely abused by anti-choice healthcare personnel (Cook and Dickens, 2006 and Dickens, 2006), who are usually not disciplined for it.

Most CO laws and policies require doctors to refer appropriately to another doctor who will provide the service – what we call “limited CO” – but this often does not happen because many anti-choice healthcare workers believe that even giving information or a referral violates their conscience. Such workers will sometimes break the law or even commit malpractice – they may refuse outright to refer, make an inappropriate referral to an anti-choice “counselling” agency, treat the patient disrespectfully, fail to disclose the services they will not provide or why, refuse to give any information on options, provide misinformation on options, or delay a referral until it is too late for an abortion (CARAL, 2003).

For example:
• In Wisconsin, “…a married woman with 4 children sought the morning-after pill at a local pharmacy. Not only did the pharmacist refuse to fill the prescription, he refused to transfer it to another pharmacist or to return the original prescription to the patient.” (Grady, 2006a)
• In Poland, women who qualify for a legal abortion are entitled to a certificate that they must present to get an abortion, but doctors will often refuse to provide one when they should, or improperly declare a certificate “invalid” when one is presented to them (Reuters, 2007).
Slide30In a Canadian survey (CARAL, 2003): “Anti-choice doctors were noted for lying about abortion services, claiming that there was not enough time to do the abortion, or that a hospital might not provide services after eight weeks”. Not only did many anti-choice doctors flatly refuse to refer women to an abortion provider, they “sometimes delayed appointments for tests until the pregnancy was too advanced to be eligible for the procedure”. In one instance, a physician told his regular patient that he “would no longer provide medical care in the future should [she] proceed with an abortion”.
• In Idaho, an anti-choice pharmacist abused the state’s conscience law by refusing to dispense Methergine, a non-abortifacient drug that prevents or controls bleeding, because the pharmacist suspected that the woman may have had an abortion. In addition, the pharmacist rudely refused to refer the woman to another pharmacy (Miller, 2011).

Allowing limited CO rests on the misconception that objecting healthcare personnel will make the required compromises, including referring for abortion or providing accurate information on the procedure. But this relies on trusting people to set aside deeply held beliefs that have already been deemed strong enough to invoke CO, making any compromise far less likely. In fact, objectors often see no moral difference between doing an act and allowing it (Card, 2007). As stated by one anti-choice writer (McGovern, 2009):

From the perspective of a doctor with a conscientious objection to abortion, referral to another practitioner is like saying, ‘I can’t rob the bank for you myself. But I know someone down the road who can.’ In other words, referral involves becoming complicit in the abortion. It is therefore something that healthcare practitioners with an objection to abortion rightly refuse to do.

Similar convictions were stated by a Canadian anti-choice pharmacist who refuses to make referrals for emergency contraception prescriptions: “I will not direct people to a source of life-taking medicine. I cannot collaborate in the modern Holocaust.” (Grady, 2006b) Since objectors often view a referral as equivalent to doing the procedure themselves, limited CO is inherently contradictory and therefore unworkable. In effect, a referral requirement tries to mitigate the harm of CO but permits that harm to occur.

Slide16CO regulations also require objectors to provide emergency care, but some doctors will risk a woman’s death rather than perform an abortion. In Poland, even though abortion is legal to save a woman’s life, doctors let a woman die out of concern that treating her for her colon disease might harm the foetus (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2010). In a highly publicized 2012 case, Savita Halappanavar died of sepsis in an Irish hospital three days after doctors refused to end her doomed pregnancy because her foetus still had a heartbeat (Berer, 2013).

In any case, the legal requirement to provide a service in a life-threatening situation is unworkable by definition. It is usually impossible to determine with certainty whether any medical case is truly life-endangering and to what degree – until the patient actually dies. Differing medical opinions on the risk of death means that some will advise a “wait and see” approach until it is too late. When it comes to abortion, the loudest voices urging a delay are often guided by personal beliefs, not medical knowledge and skills, especially in restrictive social environments hostile to abortion rights.

Granting the basic right to CO sets a precedent that can lead to dramatic extensions of CO to other areas, as well as confusion on where to draw the line. The George W. Bush administration tried to expand the legal right of CO to any public healthcare worker in the U.S. for almost any reason. Although the regulation was mostly rescinded by President Obama in 2011, it represented a serious abuse of CO because of the potential for inflicting increased harms on ever-larger numbers of patients. Further, when the U.S. government included a provision requiring full coverage of contraception in its landmark healthcare legislation enacted in 2012, it triggered many lawsuits from religious organizations and private companies, claiming that paying for their employees’ birth control would violate their faith. The issue will likely end up at the Supreme Court because of “strong disagreements” at lower court levels (Bronner, 2013), potentially leaving millions of women at the mercy of their employers’ religious beliefs.

In an article on refusal clauses, the radical American group “Priests for Life” hopes to expand the right of CO to everyone (Pavone, 2002):

Slide19There is certainly a strong defense here for those who are opposed to abortion to refuse to service abortion facilities. Let this witness begin, from plumbers, electricians, office supply companies, delivery services, printing companies, lawn and garden companies, snow removal services, computer consultants, office machine repair services, sanitation workers, roofing companies, taxi drivers, security companies, lock and key companies, cleaning and maintenance services, sign and fence companies, food services, exterminators, and every other conceivable service!

A 2010 report on CO presented at the Council of Europe (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 2010) explains CO abuses by highlighting problems at the health system level, specifically, the omission of mechanisms to ensure access to abortion:

In practice, various factors can lead to situations where women’s access to lawful medical care is affected. The mostly widely observed reasons are the lack of oversight mechanisms ensuring the implementation of existing legal provisions and policies, the non-respect of legal duties with regard to the information of patients, the absence of regulations requiring or facilitating timely action (notification of conscientious objection, appeals processes, etc.), as well as the lack of regulation regarding the scope of conscientious objection provisions.

Perhaps defining and enforcing CO regulations more consistently could mitigate the abuse of CO and help more patients access services they are entitled to. However, we argue that the systemic abuse of CO is not a mere sign of an imperfect world; rather, it indicates that such abuse is inherent in the very acceptance of CO, making laws and policies on limited CO essentially unenforceable. Endorsing CO means endorsing the principle that individual beliefs trump the health and lives of people who need a medical service.

Source: Fiala C, Arthur JH. ‘‘Dishonourable disobedience’’ — Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection. Woman – Psychosom Gynaecol Obstet (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.woman.2014.03.001

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Conscientious Objection in Colombia

Improper Use of Conscientious Objection in Bogotá, Colombia, Presents a Barrier to Safe, Legal Abortion Care
New Study Identifies Avenues for Intervention

August 10, 2016, News Release

Health care providers who invoke conscientious objection to providing or participating in abortion care in Bogotá, Colombia, can be categorized along a spectrum of objection—extreme, moderate and partial—finds a new study published in International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health. The study, “‘The Fetus Is My Patient, Too’: Attitudes Toward Abortion and Referral Among Physician Conscientious Objectors in Bogotá, Colombia,” by Lauren Fink of Emory University, ” by Lauren Fink of Emory University, et al., seeks to understand conscientious objection from the perspective of objectors themselves in order to help identify potential interventions to ease the burden of conscientious objection as a barrier to care.

When the Colombian Constitutional Court partially decriminalized abortion in 2006, the Court established a right to abortion in three circumstances: when the life or health (including mental well-being) of the mother is at risk; when a fetal anomaly is incompatible with life; and when the pregnancy is the result of rape, incest or forced insemination. The Court also outlined guidelines for health care providers who wish to invoke conscientious objection. Individuals can object, but institutions cannot; objecting physicians have a duty to refer patients to another provider; and conscientious objection “may not involve disregard for the rights of women.” Nevertheless, improperly exercised conscientious objection is not uncommon in Colombia, leading many women to seek clandestine abortions, which are often unsafe. The authors conducted in-depth interviews with 13 key informants and 15 Colombian physicians who self-identified as conscientious objectors to better understand how conscientious objection is exercised.

Read full article: Guttmacher Institute


(The following article rebuts the idea that regulation of “conscientious objection” is working, using Colombia as an example).

There is no defence for ‘Conscientious objection’ in reproductive health care
by Christian Fiala and Joyce H.Arthur
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejogrb.2017.07.023
European Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology and Reproductive Biology
Volume 216, September 2017, Pages 254-258

Abstract
A widespread assumption has taken hold in the field of medicine that we must allow health care professionals the right to refuse treatment under the guise of ‘conscientious objection’ (CO), in particular for women seeking abortions. At the same time, it is widely recognized that the refusal to treat creates harm and barriers for patients receiving reproductive health care. In response, many recommendations have been put forward as solutions to limit those harms. Further, some researchers make a distinction between true CO and ‘obstructionist CO’, based on the motivations or actions of various objectors.

This paper argues that ‘CO’ in reproductive health care should not be considered a right, but an unethical refusal to treat. Supporters of CO have no real defence of their stance, other than the mistaken assumption that CO in reproductive health care is the same as CO in the military, when the two have nothing in common (for example, objecting doctors are rarely disciplined, while the patient pays the price). Refusals to treat are based on non-verifiable personal beliefs, usually religious beliefs, but introducing religion into medicine undermines best practices that depend on scientific evidence and medical ethics. CO therefore represents an abandonment of professional obligations to patients. Countries should strive to reduce the number of objectors in reproductive health care as much as possible until CO can feasibly be prohibited. Several Scandinavian countries already have a successful ban on CO.

Read full article: Science Direct

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CO as dishonourable disobedience

As shown above, CO in reproductive healthcare is largely unworkable and inappropriate, and arguably unethical and unprofessional as well. As a ‘‘refusal to treat,’’ CO should more aptly be called dishonourable disobedience, because it violates women’s fundamental right to lawful healthcare and places the entire burden of consequences, including risks to health and life, on the shoulders of women.

The accommodation of CO in reproductive healthcare is actually surprising. Why should a doctor’s private beliefs trump the medical needs of an individual? No other sector of medicine or other kind of service delivery would allow a service refusal with so little resistance. Perhaps it arises from society’s reluctance to allow women the freedom to make their own reproductive decisions, and the perception that women need guidance or even some moral persuasion to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term.

However, most women have already decided to have an abortion before they speak to any healthcare professional. They go to a doctor only because abortion is a medical service they need but cannot perform themselves in a safe way. The reliance on a doctor to protect one’s life and health makes any right to CO in medicine unethical — and down-right dangerous in light of the fact that women often resort to unsafe do-it-yourself abortions when they are unable to access medical care. If peoples’ right to life means anything, they must be able to access necessary healthcare, which should supersede the conscience rights of others.

CO gives a person a pretext not to do their job, even though they were specifically hired to do that job and are being paid for it. Indeed, if you can opt out of part of your work without being punished, why wouldn’t you? CO is a shield to protect employees from liability for their own negligence, while placing unfair burdens on colleagues and employers. They are like employees who arrive late for work every day, forcing more dependable employees to cover for them. The unfair effects of allowing CO can be seen at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, which had to hire additional staff to make up for the refusal by 12 nurses to have any contact whatsoever with patients having an abortion — even routine tasks like taking a temperature, filling out paperwork, or walking a patient to the door after recovery. These nurses, who had essentially abandoned their professional duties and discriminated against patients, even filed a lawsuit against the hospital for ‘‘forcing’’ them to assist in abortion care against their religious objections (Giambusso, 2011).

The principle of public accommodation requires the discounting of individual conscience within a profession. Everyone’s conscience is different and cannot be coerced, which is why a free democratic society places a high value on tolerance and equal respect for all citizens. However, if individuals are permitted to exercise their conscience when serving the public, it gives social sanction to the practice of intolerance. CO invites discrimination against people needing the services being refused, and infringes their freedom of conscience. This is why the American Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination by facilities that serve the general public — a racist waiter working in a restaurant cannot refuse service to a black person.  As one writer stated about an Iowabill that would have allowed any business or organization to refuse to recognize gay marriage: ‘‘It uses a word we associate with compassion — conscience — for the sole purpose of discriminating.’’ (Basu, 2011) Similarly, CO in medicine contravenes the ethical obligation to serve the public, which is why it is dishonourable disobedience.

A healthcare provider’s personal right of conscience can and should be limited to protect the rights of others, including their safety and health. As stated in the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article18(3)  (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1976):

Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

CO violates medical ethics because doctors agree to assume professional obligations to patients when they join the profession. Patients cannot obtain services elsewhere because doctors enjoy a legal monopoly on provision of medical services, with their profession and medical knowledge fulfilling a public trust. Doctors are bound by laws on negligence and by ‘‘fiduciary duty’’ — a legal or ethical relationship of confidence or trust between two or more parties (Based on British common law, 2014). When doctors cite CO as a reason to refuse healthcare to a patient, they renege on their professional and public duties and their legal responsibilities. As such, CO should require a greater sacrifice on the part of the refuser, including a willingness to resign their position or even to go to prison (Cannold, 2010)

CO also clashes with the recent revolution in healthcare in western countries, where a new paradigm of patient-centred care, together with evidence-based medicine and a commitment to prevention, has been accepted (Weitz and Berke and Berke Fogel, 2010). One such example is in the UK, with its new Patient Choice framework adopted by the National Health Service (Department of Health, 2013). When patients take a more proactive role in managing their own health and treatments, it leads to significantly better health outcomes. But CO reinforces the stereotype of the ‘‘all-knowing’’ doctor who dictates what is best for patients, with little regard for their individual needs or even the evidence. The exercise of CO becomes an excuse for the doctor to exert personal power over the patient by imposing their own views. In practical terms, time pressures and the unequal power dynamic between a patient and a doctor mean there may be no time or opportunity to negotiate, anyway. As Dr. Julie Cantor states: ‘‘There is little recourse when care is obstructed— patients have no notice, no process, and no advocate to whom they can turn.’’ (Cantor, 2009)

Most countries still enforce abortion laws that originated in the 18th and 19th centuries, reflecting the knowledge and social mores of those times. The spirit of those laws is still alive in countries where abortion is legal but access is restricted by political measures that have nothing to do with protecting women’s health, such as obligatory counseling, waiting periods, and doctors’ signatures to confirm the woman’s mental distress. Laws that accommodate CO are even more inappropriate for less developed countries. Anthropologist and bioethicist Debora Diniz points out that developing countries tend to have greater anti-choice sentiment, a less secular culture, more dominance by the Catholic Church, and less access to abortion because of fewer facilities and providers and poor healthcare infrastructure. Such factors led Diniz to conclude that ‘‘conscientious objection in developing countries should not be seen only as an issue of accommodation, but as a constitutional offense against the stability of the secular state.’’ (Diniz, 2010)

Source: Fiala C, Arthur JH. ‘‘Dishonourable disobedience’’ — Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection. Woman – Psychosom Gynaecol Obstet (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.woman.2014.03.001

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The Growing Abuse of Conscientious Objection

Rebecca J. Cook, JD, JSD, and Bernard M. Dickens, LLB, LLM, PhD, LLD
Virtual Mentor. May 2006, Volume 8, Number 5: 337-340

Physicians’ rights to refuse to participate in medical procedures that offend their conscience may be incompatible with patients’ rights to receive lawful, medically indicated treatment. Historically, the goal of medicine has been to provide care to the sick. The World Medical Association’s modern variant of the Hippocratic Oath, The Declaration of Geneva, inspires the graduating physician to pledge that, “The health of my patient will be my first consideration” [1]. For many who enter medicine, the commitment to assist their fellow human beings and pursue a path of personal salvation through this professional calling is religiously inspired. A conflict of interest can arise if the physician’s religious or other conscientious convictions are in tension with medically indicated procedures. The obvious case is therapeutic abortion, but analogous cases include contraceptive sterilization and withdrawal of life support from otherwise viable patients. Physicians who give priority to their own moral and spiritual convictions over their patients’ need and desire for medically indicated care face a conflict that needs resolution [2].

Read full article: AMA Journal of Ethics

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Impacts of CO on women’s healthcare

Because reproductive healthcare is largely delivered to women, CO in this field has implications for women’s humanrights and constitutes discrimination. Women are often expected to fulfil a motherhood role, so they frequently face ignorance, disapproval, or even hostility when requesting abortion. In these circumstances, the exercise of CO becomes a paternalistic initiative to compel women to give birth.

Refusals to provide emergency contraception also force women to risk unwanted pregnancy, while referrals to other pharmacies can cause delays that reduce the effectiveness of the medication. Prescriptions for birth control or emergency contraception have been refused by anti-choice pharmacists in the U.S. (Planned Parenthood (Affiliates of New Jersey), 2005) and occasionally in other countries such as the U.K. (Brooke, 2010) and New Zealand (Sparrow, 2012). At least six U.S. states explicitly allow pharmacists to refuse to dispense contraception (Guttmacher Institute, 2013a). As with abortion, refusals to dispense contraception are not a mere inconvenience to women, but cause genuine harm to their reproductive autonomy, their sense of security, and their moral identity as people who deserve to be treated respectfully when requesting sexual and reproductive healthservices (McLeod, 2010). Public confrontations with objecting pharmacists compromise patient confidentiality and can shame or humiliate women.

The presumption that only a small minority of healthcare professionals will exercise CO and that others will be available to perform the medical service places limited CO on a foundation of shifting sand, further revealing its contradictory and dangerous nature. Indeed, CO can become quite widespread, leaving women without access to services across entire regions. In Italy, 69% of all gynaecologist srefuse to perform abortions, with the figure rising to over 80% in some regions (Italy Ministry of Health, 2007—2008).

In Austria, abortion providers must travel from Vienna to Salzburg once a week to do abortions at one public hospital, because gynaecologists in the region invoked CO after intense pressure from the Catholic Church and anti-choice groups. Abortion is unavailable elsewhere in Salzburg or the surrounding county (Fiala, 2013).

The example of South Africa is an important lesson in the anti-democratic nature of CO and the negative impact it can have on women. Abortion was illegal during Apartheid, and one of the first actions of the newly elected democratic government was to legalize abortion to improve women’s health (in 1996). But religious groups mounted campaigns against abortion that significantly reduced the number of willing providers. As a result, most of the healthcare professionals who should be responsible for performing abortions refuse to participate. Because of the latitude given to CO in South Africa, almost a third of South African women believe abortion is still banned, illegal abortions appear to be more common than legal ones (van Bogaert, 2002), and women who show up at public hospitals with complications are often mistreated and shamed (SANGONeT, 2012).

In countries with a minority of anti-choice doctors, women may suffer worse hardship than a short delay and a minor inconvenience, even if the doctor makes a referral. Women may be burdened with additional costs, such as for travel or daycare, and may need to take more time off work — if they can find and get to another doctor or clinic. Delayed access to abortion can also result in significant morbidity. Waiting extra weeks or even months for the procedure increases the medical risk of abortion and may require a more complicated method (for example, D&C instead of vacuum aspiration) (Cheng, 2008). Further, the delay may lead to debilitating symptoms such as severe nausea and psychological distress from a developing pregnancy they want to terminate. They may also need to hide the pregnancy from employers, friends, and family members.

Low-income and rural women are hurt the most by the exercise of CO, because such women may not have there sources to seek services elsewhere. It also disproportionately affects women from ethnic minorities, and women who experience intimate partner violence or sexual violation, who are twice as likely to need abortion services than women who don’t experience such violence (World Health Organization, 2013).

Finally, allowing CO for abortion ignores the realities of poor abortion access and the negative impact of allowing CO in that environment. Abortion is probably the most heavily restricted medical procedure in the world, despite it being one of the most common — and one that only women need, often desperately.  In such a context, governments and health systems have an even greater obligation to ensure that abortion care is fully available and accessible. Instead,abortion is frequently singled out as the main or only target for CO in many countries, reducing access even further.

Source: Fiala C, Arthur JH. ‘‘Dishonourable disobedience’’ — Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection. Woman – Psychosom Gynaecol Obstet (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.woman.2014.03.001

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Impacts of CO on women’s autonomy and human rights

Abortion is a necessary health intervention, as well as highly ethical. Women with wanted pregnancies can experience serious medical or fetal complications to the point where abortion becomes the ‘‘standard of care’’ — a medically required, evidence-based service that any practitioner should be expected to provide. CO undermines the standard of care by preventing patients from receiving accurate and unbiased information about their treatment options, and by inhibiting their ability to access such care (Weitz and Berke Fogel, 2010).

Termination of unwanted pregnancy is ethical because women do so only if they don’t see any responsible way to care for that potential child. It protects their families and their future, since women may have existing children that they can barely afford to care for, or they may want to delay their first child until they finish school (Finer et al., 2008). Their decision is well-thought out and based on personal circumstances that only they can fully appreciate. Once the decision to terminate is made, most women will go to great lengths to carry it out, regardless of the law or the risk to their safety. Globally, 40% of all pregnancies are unintended (Guttmacher Institute, 2011). Over a quarter of all pregnant women will have either an abortion or an unwanted birth (Koyama and Williams, 2005), but 49% of the 43.8 million abortions that take place every year are unsafe and mostly illegal (Sedgh et al., 2012). An estimated 47,000 women die annually from unsafe abortion (Shah and Ahman, 2010) and 8.5 million are injured (Guttmacher Institute, 2010). This is why legalizing abortion has a dramatic impact on saving women’s lives and improving their health, a phenomenon that has been demonstrated in dozens of countries over the last few decades. Internationally, women have established human rights and constitutional equality in most western countries, and the exercise of CO infringes those rights. Access to abortion (and contraception) frees women to pursue an education and career and to participate fully in public life, thereby advancing their equality, liberty, and other human rights. It allows women to better plan and provide for their families (well over half of all women requesting an abortion already have at least one child (Guttmacher Institute, 2013b)), which also benefits the entire community and society. Births of unwanted children can be detrimental to women who were denied abortion (and to their families),leading to a higher risk of poverty, health complications,and domestic violence (Foster et al., 2012). Unwanted children themselves are at higher risk for lifelong dysfunction, including child abuse or neglect, emotional handicaps, and stunted intellectual and educational development (Arthur,1999; David, 2011).

Further, the decision to have an abortion is closely linked to social and economic circumstances, and the support or sanction of the societies that women live in. Women are much more likely to experience unintended pregnancy and seek abortion if they are adolescents, live in poverty, have chaotic lives or an abusive partner, or have poor access to contraception (Major et al., 2009).

Historically, one of the prime objectives of past governments was to increase their population, with little if any consideration for the quality of life of women and their children. Former monarchies, dictatorships, and warleading countries wanted soldiers to increase their empires and serve as cannon fodder (Museum of Contraception and Abortion, 1916). This fundamental conflict between the state and the individual resulted in laws in almost everycountry that essentially forced women to have more children than they wanted. Much progress has been made over the last century, with many countries liberalizing their abortion laws. In 2010, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health called for immediate decriminalization of abortion around the world because legal restrictions had discriminatory and stigmatizing effects and violated the right to health by leading to preventable deaths and injuries (United Nations General Assembly, 2011). Canada already struck down its law entirely in 1988 and never replaced it, proving that criminal abortion laws are unnecessary and counter-productive. The Supreme Court of Canada said:‘‘Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal sanction, to carry a fetus to term unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities and aspirations, is a profound interference with a woman’s body and thus a violation of her security of the person.’’ (Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada, 2013).

In western countries today, the anti-choice movement wants women to bear children to reverse declining population levels and mitigate the effects of an ageing demographic. Invoking CO is one strategy to achieve this goal. But history provides ample evidence of the ineffectiveness of such restrictive strategies and the catastrophic consequences they lead to. Perhaps the most well-known‘‘social experiment’’ took place in Romania between 1966 and 1990. Former dictator Nicolae Ceausescu decided to increase the population by criminalizing contraception and abortion. Women were even subjected to regular gynaecological examinations to detect any pregnancy. But underground abortion networks mushroomed (as they do in any society where abortion is banned), and over the course of 20 years, an estimated 10,000 women died needlessly from illegal abortions alone. As a consequence of many unwanted pregnancies carried to term, state orphanages were overwhelmed with tens of thousands of children abandoned every year, most of whom ended up living on the street (U.S. Embassy, 2001; Westend Film+TV Produktion, 2004)

Anti-choice objections to providing abortions are based on a denial of this evidence and historical experience. The provision of safe, legal abortion is a vital public interest that negates any grounds for CO.

Source: Fiala C, Arthur JH. ‘‘Dishonourable disobedience’’ — Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection. Woman – Psychosom Gynaecol Obstet (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.woman.2014.03.001

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(July 2018) Expert group denounces the refusal to treat under ‘conscientious objection’

By Joyce Arthur
Published 5 July 2018, Rabble.ca

For the first time ever, an expert group has arrived at a majority consensus that the practice of so-called “conscientious objection” by health-care professionals should not be allowed. The experts agreed that the practice of refusing to provide legal and essential health care due to a doctor’s personal or religious beliefs is a violation of medical ethics and of patients’ right to health care. Abortion and other reproductive health care are the most commonly refused services.

Unconscionable: When Providers Deny Abortion Care is the title of the expert group’s just-released report with recommendations. It is a product of the first global meeting on the topic of “conscientious objection,” which took place in Montevideo, Uruguay in August 2017 because the refusal to treat is a major barrier to abortion access in many Latin American countries.

Continued: Rabble.ca

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Impacts of CO on abortion provision

The exercise of CO can exacerbate the lack of access to abortion care by further reducing the pool of providers. Even pro-choice doctors may decline to or be unable to provide abortion care for a variety of other reasons besides CO, most of which are unique to abortion because of its politicized nature.

The stigma and misconceptions around abortion turn CO into an attractive solution for individual healthcare providers (ironically reinforcing those negative attitudes and beliefs). Allowing CO also encourages opportunistic refusals— doctors who are ambivalent about abortion may begin to adopt CO when given that option, making it very difficult to stop its growth (Millward, 2010). The refusal to perform or assist with abortion is often not even related to personal beliefs. Most pro-choice doctors who should or could perform abortions (obstetricians/gynaecologists and general practitioners) never do them, frequently because they fear that their reputation or livelihood will suffer because of social stigma. In North America, the atmosphere of fear and intimidation created by anti-choice extremists has worsened the provider shortage. The well-publicized violence against providers gives doctors ample reason to back away from performing abortions, irrespective of their personal beliefs.

Doctors who invoke CO to not perform abortions can benefit professionally by spending more of their time delivering more ‘‘reputable’’ or higher status treatments compared to their abortion-providing colleagues. As a result, they can escape stigma and boost their careers, reputations, and salaries.

Doctors who nevertheless want to provide abortion care may be prevented from doing so by their healthcare institution or employer for a variety of reasons, or by a lack of support from their collegial and social networks (Joffe, 2009). Physicians cite obstacles such as an anti-choice climate in their workplace, and widespread ‘‘no-abortion policies’’ that exist in many hospitals and private practices (Coletti, 2011), which may threaten health care providers with instant dismissal if they provide any banned treatment. Further, many doctors are simply unable to find work or training opportunities in an environment where abortion is legally restricted and stigmatized.

Lack of training and expertise is a common reason for not doing abortions, even though early abortion is a simple procedure and doctors routinely treat miscarriage using the same techniques as for surgical abortion. In general though,specific medical school training in common abortion techniques such as vacuum aspiration is often inadequate or non-existent, even in many western countries (Koyama and Williams, 2005).

When access to abortion care is reduced, restricted, and stigmatized in so many ways, allowing any degree of CO adds further to the already serious abrogation of patients’ rights and medical ethics.

Source: Fiala C, Arthur JH. ‘‘Dishonourable disobedience’’ — Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection. Woman – Psychosom Gynaecol Obstet (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.woman.2014.03.001

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The CO debate: ‘Conscientious Objection’ is still dishonourable disobedience

Bpas reproductive review,  14 July 2014

An article by Joyce Arthur and Christian Fiala arguing ‘Why We Need to Ban “Conscientious Objection” in Reproductive Health Care’ provoked much discussion. Here, Arthur and Fiala respond to their critics.

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So-called ‘conscientious objection’ (CO) to contraception and abortion is a misnomer because it is actually an abuse of authority on the part of healthcare professionals who refuse to provide this care. We argue it is more correct to call CO ‘dishonourable disobedience’ to professional duties, ethical codes, and democratically decided laws.

In March 2014, the journal Woman – Psychosomatic Gynaecology and Obstetrics published our comprehensive article explaining why CO in reproductive healthcare is dishonourable disobedience. Our criticism of CO uniquely delved into the underlying premises of CO to show that it is fundamentally contradictory and unworkable. Our shorter follow-up article then criticised the acceptance of CO by secular medical and health organisations.

We received several critiques, one published in bpas Reproductive Review, another in RH Reality Check by Global Doctors for Choice, and a few informal criticisms relayed on listservs or online comments, and at a recent conference in Lisbon, Portugal, where we presented our ideas. We paraphrase these criticisms below – most of which we feel ignored or misunderstood our position – and follow with our response.

1. The individual’s right to hold and manifest religious or other personal beliefs is an essential human right. The ability to exercise conscience is fundamental to individual integrity.

We fully agree. But defending the right to freedom of conscience totally misses our key point – that CO in reproductive healthcare is not genuine CO. Refusal by a health care provider to treat a dependent patient is not an exercise of conscience, it is an imposition of one’s personal beliefs on a vulnerable person. It is a veto of a patient’s right to healthcare. It is an unjustified refusal to do the job one was hired and paid to do. It is an act of discrimination because reproductive healthcare is largely delivered to women.

CO in reproductive healthcare has nothing in common with the military CO from which it is derived – or more accurately, falsely appropriated from. Those who object to military service are ordinary citizens drafted into compulsory service, while healthcare professionals are in a privileged position of trust and authority – a position they chose and willingly trained for, with the full understanding that it entails duties to patients and an obligation to provide safe and necessary medical care. The specialty of Obstetrics/Gynecology in particular carries with it the obligation to help women with unplanned pregnancies.

Licensed medical professionals also enjoy a monopoly on healthcare, and people have no choice but to go to them for care. Despite this, healthcare professionals usually face no obligation to justify their refusals, rarely face any disciplinary measure, retain their positions and salaries, and often have their objection protected by law. They may also benefit in other ways, such as freeing up their time by offloading work burdens onto colleagues (while still being paid for ‘treating’ patients they refused), protecting their reputation by avoiding abortion stigma, and boosting their careers by performing more lucrative or prestigious activities instead. In contrast, military objectors must justify their stance to higher authorities, are often required to undergo a rigorous review process, and are always punished.

The alleged parallel in terms of refraining from killing is also turned upside down for CO in reproductive healthcare. Abortion and contraception preserve the health and lives of women, while those practicing CO in medicine put women’s health and lives at risk. There is no comparison between killing a living person in war and ending the development of a gestational sac, especially since prohibiting the latter directly endangers women’s lives.

2. Doctors should not be forced to do what they don’t want to do, and certainly no doctor should be forced to do an abortion if they are opposed. It is hard to see how laws designed to compel professionals to act against their conscience can be of benefit to anybody.

This is a specious argument, one that also reinforces abortion stigma by treating it differently from other forms of healthcare. We should not lend support to the anti-choice view that it’s a natural and expected thing to not want to do abortions.

When a person is paid to do a job, we don’t consider them ‘forced’ into doing it, even if they don’t like the job. Being forced implies having no choice or recompense, but workers apply and compete for jobs in order to earn money, with an understanding of the duties involved.

When you rush to the hospital for an emergency appendectomy, you don’t worry whether the surgeon is being ‘forced’ to do it. Even if the surgeon hates doing appendectomies, or dislikes you personally, you still fully expect the surgeon to perform your surgery in a professional manner. Likewise, you don’t worry if your plumber is being ‘forced’ to fix your pipes when you call, or if the cashier is being ‘forced’ to ring up your purchases when you go shopping.
It’s their job!

If a worker doesn’t believe in their job or objects to certain required tasks, they always have options, as do healthcare professionals:

1. In the first place, they should refrain from training for or accepting a job they will be unable to carry out for personal reasons. For example, a person should not train to be a pilot if they are afraid of flying and will refuse to take off.
2. They can quit and find another job, request a transfer to an area where the objected-to task is not required, or obtain training for something different that they won’t object to.
3. They can keep their job by making the considered decision to fully adhere to the job requirements despite their distaste or reluctance. (No job is ‘perfect,’ after all.)
4. They can refuse to do their job and submit to discipline by their employer, including the risk of demotion or termination.

Only Options 1 and 2 represent true conscientious objection, by the way.

3. We need to find a balance between the rights of women and the rights of health care professionals. It’s an issue of competing rights.

This argument has a false premise – that a patient’s need for basic medical care is morally equivalent to protecting a healthcare provider’s personal beliefs. The belief that women’s right to life and health ‘competes with’ or should be ‘balanced’ with doctors’ supposed right to refuse them care trivialises the health and lives of women. It assumes that women’s human rights are negotiable and dispensable as soon as someone disagrees with them. But why should the refusal to treat a woman who needs reproductive care be accepted, when the refusal to treat someone who is gay, black, or Muslim would be considered discrimination? Indeed, various attempts by governments and businesses in the U.S. to refuse services to gay people have failed for good reason, such as bakeries refusing to bake cakes for gay weddings. Like many other enterprises, medicine serves the public, which means healthcare workers have no right to refuse certain services to women.

In addition to the right to life and health, patients also have a right to conscience, as well as liberty, equal protection, privacy, dignity, and other basic rights. These may all be denied in addition when a doctor vetoes their healthcare. Even if the exercise of CO was true CO (which it isn’t), the sole right of freedom to conscience cannot possibly outweigh or be balanced against this long list of fundamental human rights. Ironically, Global Doctors for Choice and others recognize that human rights are ‘subject only to limitations necessary to protect the fundamental rights of others,’ but they fail to see that a full range of human rights need protection from the tyranny of CO.

There is no ‘balance’ when an authority figure is allowed to impose their beliefs on a powerless person who needs the services that only the person in power can provide. It’s the patient who pays the price and bears the burden of CO in reproductive healthcare, not the healthcare provider. Any denial of care is unacceptable because it inevitably creates at least some degree of harm to patients, ranging from inconvenience, humiliation, and psychological stress, to additional costs, delays in care, unwanted pregnancy, increased medical risks, and even death. The resulting real harms inflicted onto patients mean that CO in reproductive healthcare cannot be justified.

4. Conscientious objection too often is ill defined, unregulated, and inconsistently practiced. The harms and excesses of CO can be mitigated by regulating CO, educating healthcare professionals on their duties, and requiring healthcare systems to ensure that patients have access to legal services.

Many people support what we call ‘limited CO,’ which generally allows physicians to refuse to provide a particular medical service, but requires them to disclose their objection to patients, refer them to another provider who can deliver the service, impart accurate information on all options, and provide care in cases of emergency. Further, healthcare institutions are encouraged to have a system to ensure oversight of objectors and availability of non-objecting staff, so that all patients have access to services.

Our critics are simply repeating what they wish for, while failing to provide a single example where the practice of limited CO works consistently in real life. We describe in our journal paper why limited CO is a fundamental contradiction and consequently cannot work. Attempts to regulate CO are ignored and abused worldwide because the objectives of the requirements imposed on refusers are completely at odds with the refusers’ own objectives. The only reason healthcare workers invoke CO is to hinder their patients from a certain action, such as using contraception or having an abortion. But requirements such as the obligation to refer aim to negate the refuser’s actions so the patient can still obtain the needed treatment. That’s a contradiction – it’s giving with one hand while taking away with the other. Since the refuser’s personal beliefs have already been allowed to override patient care, how can we expect them to suddenly backtrack and compromise their beliefs?

Real life experience confirms that objecting healthcare workers often believe that giving a referral makes them ‘complicit,’ so they may refuse to do so. Some will also provide misinformation or treat the patient disrespectfully, or even let a woman die rather than give her a legal abortion, as happened in Ireland in 2012.

We don’t deny that some portion of objectors are probably more uninformed than ‘conscientious’ – or perhaps just ambivalent – and we agree that some could be persuaded to stop exercising CO for contraception and abortion. That would require education on the need for those services and why women request them, exposure to patients requesting the services, knowledge of the negative effects of CO on patients, and a clear understanding of the fiduciary duty to patients.

Nevertheless, it must be recognised that a significant proportion of objectors, perhaps even a majority, will never agree to abide by restrictions on CO – particularly those who believe that abortion is murder. Limited CO is therefore seriously inadequate to mitigate the harms of CO. Moreover, it places extra burdens on healthcare systems and non-objecting colleagues, burdens they should not have to shoulder. It is inappropriate for healthcare systems to spend resources to help employees shirk their duties, deny legitimate care to patients, and transfer their workload to colleagues.

5. CO is supported by professional medical groups and international human rights and health organisations.

It’s true that many medical organizations have policies or codes that attempt to limit or regulate CO in the ways we mentioned above, such as FIGO, the WHO, the ACOG, the AAFP, and others. The United Nations asks states to ‘ensure that conscientious objection exemptions are well-defined in scope and well-regulated in use and that referrals and alternative services are available in cases where the objection is raised.’ Global Doctors for Choice (page S53) has made policy recommendations to accommodate objectors, such as standardizing a definition of CO, developing eligibility criteria for objectors, registering objectors, and defining objector obligations to refer, give accurate information, and provide emergency treatment.

In other words, these organisations recognise the inherent challenges in administering CO and its harms to patients, yet permit them to occur in the mistaken belief that they can be mitigated to an acceptable extent. Part of the problem is that these groups have accepted the dishonest use of the term ‘conscientious objection’ by religious and anti-choice groups who wish to deny women’s right to health and life. Secular and pro-choice medical organizations should have no part in this. In fact, tolerance of CO by these groups often directly contradicts other key parts of their policies and ethical codes, such as clauses instructing doctors to do no harm, provide care in their patients’ best interests, and practice evidence-based medicine.

Medical and human rights organisations should instead be at the forefront of exposing the harms of CO and working to reduce and prohibit it. This should involve implementing mechanisms to prevent CO by screening out objectors from entry into training programs or disciplines that involve reproductive health, including family medicine and the obstetrics-gynecology specialty. Enforcement also needs to include punishment for objectors.

6. ‘Health-care institutions have an obligation to provide all components of care and to define the limits of refusal… but we disagree about whether that obligation rests primarily at the practitioner or the institutional level.’

This criticism is a direct quote from Global Doctors for Choice in response to our follow-up article. Note the two contradictory statements that sit side-by-side in the first part of the sentence. An obligation to provide ‘all components of care’ must obviously preclude the refusal of care.

We’re not sure why Global Doctors for Choice thinks we disagree that the obligation to provide all components of care rests primarily with healthcare institutions (and the state and civil society). We only disagree on what those specific obligations should be. Our journal paper has various suggestions on what these institutions should do to ensure comprehensive reproductive care without barriers or stigma – such as regulating public health systems to guarantee abortion provision, providing financial aid to hospitals to recruit abortion providers, providing compulsory training in contraception provision and abortion techniques at medical schools, public education to reduce abortion stigma, and other initiatives.

Obviously, some responsibility always rests with individual healthcare workers, who need to fulfill their duty to patients, follow medical protocols, adhere to codes of ethics, and so on. But monitoring and enforcement needs to be done at the institutional level – by hospitals, government health authorities or departments, and medical organizations. For example, if objectors are allowed to continue objecting, they should be required to justify each refusal to a Board or committee, as well as accept financial liability and discipline for each refusal, including the risk of being transferred, demoted, or terminated.

7. Reproductive healthcare is not the only area of medicine affected by CO. End-of-life care and treatments involving stem-cell therapies are also areas where CO has been invoked.

Our paper focused on abortion and contraception because these two services are both essential and common, unlike the first two examples given in the criticism. Together, contraception and abortion comprise the vast majority of healthcare services objected to.

There are some valid cases where a healthcare professional may conscientiously refuse a requested legal treatment, but this should be done in the context of honoring their professional obligations and medical ethics. Doctors can refuse treatment on the principle of ‘beneficence’ or ‘non-maleficence’ to ensure the patient is helped or at least not harmed. This only applies in limited circumstances, such as a patient who requests a risky experimental treatment, or a mentally disturbed patient who wants an unnecessary procedure such as an amputation.

We also support refusal by healthcare professionals if they are asked to perform illegal or quasi-legal activities that injure people and violate their rights, such as torture or genital mutilation of children. However, these are not legitimate medical treatments and are not requested by the patient; therefore, they cannot be called CO.

8. Banning CO could have the inadvertent consequence of worsening access by hardening the opposition of those who might be incrementally persuaded to provide these services.

This is pure speculation with no evidence or examples to support it. But there is evidence to the contrary: Allowing CO significantly worsens access to legal medical services for women. Decades of this ‘social experiment’ have shown it to be a clear-cut failure. Wouldn’t it be worth trying another approach?

The real challenge in banning ‘dishonourable disobedience’ will not be from those who might be persuaded to provide reproductive health services, but from those who will never be persuaded. The anti-choice movement fights ferociously against any restriction on their claimed right to deny rights to others. But the fear of intimidation and ugly politics is not a good basis for continuing to allow patients’ rights to be violated. We need to stand up to the bullying from anti-choice activists, who aren’t as strong as they think they are. We can defeat them. Most of their claims are demonstrably false as well as oppressive. Their views are increasingly at odds with the world’s ever-stronger focus on securing equality and human rights for all, especially women. Our modern society owes no respect to views that deny basic life-saving healthcare to women.
Source: www.reproductivereview.org

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Institutional CO and violation of pro-choice right to conscience

Most CO laws and policies shield only healthcare professionals who refuse to participate in a given medical service like abortion, but fail to protect those who are ready to perform such interventions. Bioethicist Bernard Dickens refers to the stance of pro-choice healthcare workers as‘‘conscientious commitment,’’ pointing out that ‘‘religion has no monopoly on conscience’’. For example, many doctors and healthcare personnel working in illegal settings around the world have provided safe abortions to women in desperate need. ‘‘Conscientiously committed practitioners often need courage to act against prevailing legal, religious, and even medical orthodoxy following the honourable medical ethic of placing patients’ interests above their own.’’(Dickens, 2008) Such practitioners deserve legal and institutional protection for their commitment to their patients. Physician Lisa H. Harris has also recognized that caregivers may be compelled by conscience to provide abortion services, noting that the one-sided ‘‘equation of conscience with non-provision of abortion contributes to the stigmatization of abortion providers,’’ leading to provider shortage sand even harassment and violence (Harris, 2012).

A prime example of negating a pro-choice right to conscience is when health systems such as Catholic hospitals claim the right to exercise their ‘‘conscience’’ by refusing to perform some reproductive health services, and then imposing that on all their staff and patients regardless of differing personal beliefs. Such policies may even be unwritten because they are based on the personal religious beliefs of hospital administrators (Nowicka, 2008). In Austria, almost all hospitals, both Catholic and public, refuse to provide legal abortions (Wimmer-Puchinger, 1995), and the director of a Catholic hospital even admitted in a media interview that a doctor would be fired for performing an abortion (Pongauer Nachrichten, 2004).

However, many Catholic healthcare personnel believe they are helping women and saving lives by providing abortions, and that being prohibited from doing so — even to save a woman’s life — would be a violation of their own religious beliefs, as well as medical ethics and the directive to ‘‘do no harm’’. Indeed, 37% of obstetricians/gynaecologists who practice in religiously affiliated institutions have had a conflict with their institution over its doctrinal-based policies (not just abortion), including 52% of Ob/Gyns in Catholic institutions (Stulberg et al., 2012).

At a Catholic hospital in Arizona, a nun in charge of the hospital’s ethics committee was ‘‘automatically excommunicated’’ and ‘‘reassigned’’ after she decided to save a woman’s life by providing an emergency abortion. As further punishment, the local bishop even revoked the hospital’s Catholic designation (Associated Press, 2010). In Germany, two separate Catholic hospitals refused to give a raped woman a gynaecological examination to preserve evidence,or even any counseling or support. Staff had been threatened with dismissal for treating her, because the hospitals wanted to avoid having to offer advice on abortion or emergency contraception (The Local (Germany), 2013).

American women experiencing an ectopic pregnancy or miscarriage have been denied emergency life-saving treatment by religiously affiliated hospitals, in violation of accepted medical standards and federal laws (National Women’s Law Center, 2011). Ectopic pregnancies, in which the embryo implants outside the uterus, are life-threatening to women. The pregnancy cannot be saved under any circumstance, so the standard of care is to immediately administer the drug methotrexate or to surgically remove the pregnancy. But because methotrexate is also used for abortion, Catholic hospitals refuse to provide it. Instead, they frequently force women to wait until their fallopian tube ruptures, increasing the woman’s suffering and putting her life and future fertility at serious risk.

When CO is invoked by a health system on behalf of all its employees, it will likely impede women’s access to sexual and reproductive health services far more than CO by individual doctors. In smaller communities, religiously based hospitals are often the only facility around, which reduces or eliminates access to a range of reproductive health services (female sterilization, emergency contraception, abortion etc.) for the entire region. This abandons local women to risk needless suffering or even death if they require essential reproductive healthcare (Berer, 2013; Catholics for a Free Choice, 2003). The woman’s religion or beliefs are disregarded by the institution, even though Catholic women in the U.S. have abortions at the same rates as non-Catholics, and 98% have used a form of contraception banned by their Church (Catholics for Choice, 2011). Further, institutional CO sanctions only one sectarian religious view among many, since most organized religions, including Catholicism, have liberal streams of thought that support the right to abortion in some or most cases (Maguire Daniel, 2001). Despite this, most religiously affiliated institutions that exercise CO are publicly funded and serve entire communities with diverse views. In effect, female citizens of countries with government-funded healthcare are paying taxes to support a discriminatory system that denies them essential care based on their child-bearing capacity.

An amended resolution allowing institutional CO was forced through by anti-choice voting members in October 2010 at the Council of Europe, via a series of political tactics that subverted a democratic vote. The original resolution would have provided the first-ever official recommendations on how governments could ‘‘balance’’ women’s right to required healthcare with healthcare workers’ claim of CO. The corrupted resolution elevated a foetus over a woman’s life, even the life of her family and other children, and essentially gave hospitals in Europe an escape clause from being held responsible or financially liable for neglect or harm inflicted onto patients (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 2010). The resolution still stands, although later decisions by the European Court of Human Rights in abortion-related cases (R.R. v. Poland; P. and S. v.Poland) tried to redress the situation with this oxymoronicruling: ‘‘States are obliged to organize their health service system. . .to ensure that the effective exercise of freedom of conscience by health professionals. . .does not prevent patents from obtaining access to services to which they are entitled. . .’’ (European Court of Human Rights, 2012)

International human rights frameworks confirm that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is a right that only individual human beings can enjoy. In the words of Christine McCafferty, the Rapporteur for the committee that produced the Council of Europe report: ‘‘. . .only individuals can have a soul or a conscience. . . Institutions such as hospitals cannot, by definition, have a conscience.’’(Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 2010)

Source: Fiala C, Arthur JH. ‘‘Dishonourable disobedience’’ — Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection. Woman – Psychosom Gynaecol Obstet (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.woman.2014.03.001

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Eliminating CO in reproductive healthcare

The unregulated practice of CO in reproductive healthcare has become entrenched in many countries and health systems, resulting in widespread negative consequences for the women concerned and violations of their rights (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 2010). Even where a law or policy allows limited CO, abuse of that right is common. This implies that objecting personnel cannot be trusted to exercise the right responsibly, and that those who abuse CO are not qualified to be healthcare workers. Even doctors who exercise CO within the law are arguably unsuited for their position because they are demonstrating an inability to perform their job — that is, they are allowing religious beliefs or some other personal issue to interfere with their job performance to the extent of negating their professional duty to patients.

Abortion is the most frequently performed surgical intervention in the obstetrics/gynecology specialty (although it is also performed by many general practitioners). Becoming an Ob/Gyn engenders a special responsibility towards female patients, since a significant number of them will experience an unwanted pregnancy leading them to request abortions. Ob/Gyns have serious ethical obligations to those patients.

We argue that healthcare personnel should respect the accepted ethical standard of a non-judgmental approach towards their patients for all essential healthcare, with no exceptions. Consequently, we propose that healthcare providers be prohibited from a blanket right to refuse to perform or refer for abortion or dispense contraception for personal or religious reasons. Our recommended prohibition is specific to abortion and contraception because these two medical services are both essential and common, but are overwhelmingly the ones that objectors refuse to deliver.

Further, we propose the following specific remedies to reduce and eventually eliminate CO in reproductive healthcare. Everyone aspiring to enter health professions that involve reproductive healthcare should be required to declare that they will not allow their personal beliefs to interfere with their management of patients to the point of discrimination.  Medical students entering the Ob/Gynspecialty should be informed about the full scope of the specialty, including treating women with unwanted pregnancies. Students should be rejected if they do not wish to learn and prescribe contraception or perform abortions for CO reasons. All Ob/Gyns should be required to dispense birth control and perform abortions as part of their practice (unless there is a legitimate medical or professional reason not to). General practitioners should be expected to dispense contraception if requested, and perform abortions if they have the skills and capacity, or else refer appropriately. Pharmacists should be compelled to dispense all lawfully prescribed drugs without exceptions. Institutional CO should be completely prohibited for health systems and businesses that serve the general public.

Monitoring and enforcement measures should be put into place to ensure that prohibitions on CO are followed. After all, CO is a form of resistance to rules or laws, so those who exercise CO must be prepared to accept punishment for their disobedience,  just as in any other profession. Doctors should be sanctioned when they violate laws or codes of ethics that prohibit CO. Disciplinary measures could include a review process, an official reprimand and order to correct, and could escalate to loss of medical license, dismissal, or even criminal charges. In addition, any costs involved in the exercise of CO should be borne by the health professional or institution, who must be held liable for any health risks and negative consequences of their refusal. Patients should be legally entitled to sue and to claim compensation for any physical or mental harm, and for additional costs resulting from the refusal to treat.

Over time, such measures should result in a reduction in the number of anti-choice healthcare workers in the field of reproductive healthcare who refuse to deliver patient-centered care. Those who decide to remain and provide abortions and contraception could adopt an attitude of ‘‘professional distance’’ in order to separate their personal beliefs from their work duties. They could derive satisfaction from obeying laws and codes of ethics, respecting patient needs and autonomy, keeping their jobs or licenses, and furthering workplace harmony (McLeod, 2008) Outside their work lives, they are free to express their beliefs in many other ways.

Implementing such measures may seem like a daunting task given the ongoing stigma against abortion and the strength of the anti-choice movement. But with political will, much could be done at local, national, and international levels to ensure that contraception and abortion services are widely available and accessible to all who need them. For example, governments could regulate public health systems to guarantee abortion provision, and provide financial aid to hospitals to recruit abortion providers. Other needed measures include compulsory training in contraception provision and abortion techniques at medical schools, security measures to protect doctors and patients such as clinic buffer zones, full funding of contraception and abortion through government health insurance,  public education to reduce abortion stigma, and other initiatives. The Council of Europe has already recommended that States should ‘‘guarantee women’s effective exercise of their right of access to a safe and legal abortion;. . .lift restrictions which hinder. . .access to safe abortion, and. . .offer suitable financial cover.’’ (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 2008b)

Source: Fiala C, Arthur JH. ‘‘Dishonourable disobedience’’ — Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection. Woman – Psychosom Gynaecol Obstet (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.woman.2014.03.001

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(June 2018) Unconscionable: When Providers Deny Abortion Care

by International Women’s Health Coalition and Mujer y Salud en Uruguay
(Dr. Christian Fiala is a contributor)
June 2018

The International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC) and Mujer y Salud en Uruguay (MYSU) co-organized a global Convening on Conscientious Objection: Strategies to Counter the Effects, in August 2017. The meeting was designed to analyze and address the phenomenon of health care providers refusing to provide abortion care by using personal belief as a justification. The organizers were called to action by the global expansion of this barrier to abortion access and the experiences of women who were denied their right to an essential service. Forty-five participants from 22 countries convened in Montevideo, Uruguay, including activists and advocates, health care and legal professionals, researchers, academics, and policy-makers. The convening catalyzed an agreement that proponents of women’s rights should challenge the use of conscience claims to deny access to abortion care. The participants also identified strategies to counter the adverse effects that the refusal to provide care can have on the health and rights of those needing services.

Throughout three days of presentations and working groups (appendix B), participants shared their experiences and expertise on policies and legal frameworks, ethics, health care training and provision, activism, research, and communications. The result: recommendations that advocates can use to tackle the growing trend of health providers using claims of “conscientious objection” to deny abortion services. In this report, we present the key points and strategies discussed at the convening, with practical recommendations at the end of each section, and a summary of takeaways in the conclusion.

Click here to download the report [PDF]
Click here to view Policy Brief based on the report.

Excerpts from Executive Summary

The global women’s movement has fought for many years to affirm safe and legal abortion as a fundamental right, and the global trend has been the liberalization of abortion laws. Progress is not linear, however, and persistent barriers prevent these laws and policies from increasing women’s access to services. One such obstacle is the growing use of conscience claims to justify refusal of abortion care.

Often called “conscientious objection,” a concept historically associated with the right to refuse to take part in the military or in warfare on religious or moral grounds, the term has recently been co-opted by anti-choice movements. Indeed, accommodations for health care providers to refuse to provide care are often deliberately inserted into policies with the aim of negating the hard-fought right to abortion care.

Existing evidence reveals a worrisome and growing global trend of health care providers who are refusing to deliver abortion and other sexual and reproductive health care. This phenomenon violates the ethical principle of “do no harm,” and has grave consequences for women, especially those who are already more vulnerable and marginalized.

A woman denied an abortion might have no choice but to continue an unintended pregnancy. She may resort to a clandestine, unsafe abortion, with severe consequences for her health or risk of death. She might be forced to seek out another provider, which can be costly in time and expense. All of these scenarios can lead to health problems, mental anguish, and economic hardship.

International human rights standards to date do not require states to guarantee a right to “conscientious objection” for health care providers. On the contrary, human rights treaty monitoring bodies have called for limitations on the exercise of conscience claims when states do allow them, in order to ensure that providers do not hinder access to services and thus infringe on the rights of patients. They call out states’ insufficient regulation of the use of “conscientious objection,” and direct states to take steps to guarantee patient access to services.

….

Patients’ health and rights should never be subordinate to providers’ individual concerns. Health care providers who put their personal beliefs over their professional obligations toward their patients threaten the health care profession’s integrity and its objectives. Nothing would stop such individuals from joining the health care profession, but they ought to specialize in fields in which their abilities to provide comprehensive services is not undermined by their personal beliefs.

Joining the health care profession is voluntary, unlike conscripted military service. The military objector pays a price, often undergoing a government vetting process, carrying out obligatory alternative service, and frequently facing stigma and discrimination. In the case of the refusal of health care based on conscience claims, the providers do not pay a price, while others do. The most severely affected, of course, is the person denied care. Providers who refuse to deliver a service also increase the workloads of their peers who choose to uphold their professional obligations to provide comprehensive care. Finally, accommodating providers who refuse to perform essential aspects of their jobs can cause costly disruptions and inefficiencies in the health care system and divert precious resources away from service provision.

Currently, more than 70 jurisdictions have provisions that allow so-called “conscientious objection” in health care, according to an analysis of preliminary data from the World Health Organization’s Global Abortion Policies Database. Many national laws stipulate that health care providers are required to carry out an abortion in case of an emergency, or if no one else is available. Evidence clearly shows, however, that even where regulations are in place, they are extremely difficult—and costly—to enforce. Despite the difficulty of regulating conscience claims, participants agreed that governments should enforce regulations and ensure that all women are able to access affordable, comprehensive health care.

Most convening participants agreed that health care policies should not allow for the refusal to provide services based on conscience claims. Where policy-makers are revising abortion laws or policies, they should not make references to conscience claims. Enshrining into law the notion that providers’ personal beliefs can determine the provision of health care opens up the door to abuses and legitimizes conscience claims.

Finally, the convening participants resoundingly agreed that health care providers and women’s rights advocates must not cede the term “conscience” to those who misapply it to deny others health care, which should more appropriately be called “refusal to provide services” or “denial of services based on conscience claims.” They agreed to bring the agreements from the convening, and the recommendations captured at the end of this report, to their own work, so that no one is denied their right to health care.

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(Jun 2018) Conscientious objection in medicine: accommodation versus professionalism and the public good

by Udo Schuklenk
Br Med Bull. 2018 Jun 1;126(1):47-56.
Doi: 10.1093/bmb/ldy007

Abstract

In recent years questions have arisen about the moral justification for the accommodation of health care professionals who refuse, on conscience grounds as opposed to professional grounds, to provide particular professional services to eligible patients who request that kind of service.

Central to concerns about the accommodation claims of conscientious objectors is that health care professionals volunteer to join their professions that typically they are the monopoly providers of such services and that a health care professional’s refusal to provide professional services on grounds that are not professional judgements amounts to unprofessional conduct. Defenders of conscientious objection maintain that in a liberal society respect for a professional’s conscience is of sufficient importance that conscientious objectors ought to be accommodated. To deny conscientious objectors accommodation would reduce diversity in the health care professions, it would deny objectors unfairly equality of opportunity, and it would constitute a serious threat to the moral integrity of conscientious objectors.

Source: British Medical Bulletin

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(June 2018) No GP should be allowed opt out of abortions

by Newton Emerson
Thu, Jun 14, 2018

The UK supreme court sat for the first time in Belfast last month, hearing an appeal into the “gay cake” case, among others.

“People will of course not expect an answer any time soon,” the president of the court said upon reserving judgment.

Another thing nobody expects is for the court to let bakers opt into a register of those willing to ice gay cakes, comprising only a handful of bakers in the country, with people obliged to travel to find them.

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(June 2018) Conscientious objection: a morally insupportable misuse of authority

Arianne Shahvisi
June 1, 2018
Volume: 13 issue: 2, page(s): 82-87
https://doi.org/10.1177/1477750917749945

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the conscience clause around abortion provision in England, Scotland and Wales is inadequate for two reasons. First, the patient and doctor are differently situated with respect to social power. Doctors occupy a position of significant moral and epistemic authority with respect to their patients, who are vulnerable and relatively disempowered. Doctors are rightly required to disclose their conscientious objection, but given the positioning of the patient and doctor, the act of doing so exploits the authority of the medical establishment in asserting the legitimacy of a particular moral view. Second, the conscientious objector plays an unusual and self-defeating moral role. Since she must immediately refer the patient on to another doctor who does not hold a conscientious objection, she becomes complicit, via her necessary causal role, in the implementation of the procedure. This means that doctors are not able to prevent abortions, rather, they are required to ensure that they are carried out, albeit by others. Since removing the disclosure and referral requirements may prevent patients from accessing standard medical care, the conscience clause should instead be revoked, and those opposed to abortion should be encouraged to select other specialities or professions. This would protect patients from judgement, and doctors from complicity.

Source: Sage Journals

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(May 2018) Public cartels, private conscience

Michael Cholbi
May 30, 2018
Sage Journals
https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18779146

Abstract

Many contributors to debates about professional conscience assume a basic, pre-professional right of conscientious refusal and proceed to address how to ‘balance’ this right against other goods. Here I argue that opponents of a right of conscientious refusal concede too much in assuming such a right, overlooking that the professions in which conscientious refusal is invoked nearly always operate as public cartels, enjoying various economic benefits, including protection from competition, made possible by governments exercising powers of coercion, regulation, and taxation. To acknowledge a right of conscientious refusal is to license professionals to disrespect the profession’s clients, in opposition to liberal ideals of neutrality, and to engage in moral paternalism toward them; to permit them to violate duties of reciprocity they incur by virtue of being members of public cartels; and to compel those clients to provide material support for conceptions of the good they themselves reject. However, so long as (a) a public cartel discharges its obligations to distribute the socially important goods they have are uniquely authorized to provide without undue burden to its clientele, and (b) conscientious refusal has the assent of other members of a profession, individual professionals’ claims of conscience can be accommodated.

Source: Sage Journals

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(April 2018) Letter to the Editor: The FSRH guideline on conscientious objection disrespects patient rights and endangers their health

BMJ Sexual and Reproductive Health (Volume 44, Issue 2)

By Christian Fiala and Joyce H. Arthur
Published online 12 April 2018

We write to offer feedback on the new Faculty of Sexual & Reproductive Healthcare (FSRH) guideline on conscientious objection (CO) that was the subject of an editorial in the January 2018 issue of this journal. Our position, for which we have a clear evidence base, is set out below.

Essential parts of the new FSRH guideline, as well as the reasoning behind it, contradict the available evidence around the practice of CO, so we predict that the guideline will largely fail in practice.

We have written extensively on the problem of so-called CO in reproductive healthcare. The available evidence clearly shows that CO is a violation of medical ethics and patients’ rights, has no place in reproductive healthcare, and has misleadingly been co-opted from military CO. CO in healthcare is about imposing one’s religious or personal beliefs, including any negative consequences, on vulnerable others. This is the opposite of military CO. Refusing medical care based on personal beliefs is a negation of evidence-based medical practice and a repudiation of the overriding goal of medicine – to care for patients.

Continued: BMJ Sexual and Reproductive Health

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(Jan 2018) A twist on conscientious objection: a regulatory proposal based on the practice of legal abortion in Argentina

Translated from Spanish: “Una vuelta de tuerca a la objeción de conciencia: Una propuesta regulatoria a partir de las prácticas del aborto legal en Argentina”

by Agustina Ramón Michel and Sonia Ariza, on behalf of CEDES and Ipas

January 2018

Note: The authors do support allowing “CO” – however, they propose strict regulation of it, including enforcement measures. Most of the paper is spent critiquing “CO” and documenting its harms and gross overreach in the context of legal abortion care in Argentina. Notably, the authors recommend dropping the term “conscientious objection” in favour of the more accurate and fair phrasing: “refusal to provide abortion services on moral or religious grounds.”

 

Abstract:
This paper addresses the case of health professionals who refuse to provide legal abortions based on religious or moral beliefs, known as conscientious objection (CO). In much of the West, conscientious objection is permitted in the context of health services. There are several forms of objection: pharmacists who refuse to sell contraceptives; physicians who invoke religious beliefs as grounds for denying fertility services to single or same-sex couples or for tubal ligations or abortion; health professionals who invoke the rights of persons with disabilities to refuse prenatal diagnosis, or gender equality legislation to oppose body-fitting interventions; nurses who refuse to provide services to women who request or have had an abortion because of religious beliefs; medical students who refuse to use animals during medical training on moral grounds, among others.

In this paper on CO to abortion in Argentina, we focus on two fundamental and interdependent aspects: the reconceptualization of this phenomenon and a proposal to regulate it within the framework of a public health policy. In addition to secondary sources, we obtained opinions and perceptions from a survey of 269 members of the public health system and 11 semi-structured interviews with managers and chiefs of services in the public health system about the forms that CO takes, its causes and impact.

Selected Extracts:
In the health context, CO clauses have been legislative tools used by certain professionals to excuse themselves from certain mandated tasks legally but which they consider objectionable on moral grounds.24 Indeed, CO has been a political tool to resist legislative and of public policies that challenge and dismantle the structure of sexuality traditional.25 According to Fiala and Arthur, CO “has allowed people to boycott democratically approved laws based on the deference of society to religious freedom and traditional values that assign women roles of maternity and child rearing”.26

In Argentina, these uses of CO are also observed.27 We have seen that the hierarchy of the Catholic Church has called for the use of objection as a mechanism to prevent access to contraceptives and abortion.28 Likewise, Catholic professional associations have developed guidelines for their members that privilege the use of CO.29 It has even been used in ways more associated with civil disobedience.30
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This historicization of CO in the field of sexuality and reproduction should be contrasted with that of compulsory military service, the origin of this practice. They are related stories but differ in fundamental aspects. Alegre points out that in the field of sexual and reproductive health we are facing a “new objection”, different from the traditional objection to military service.40 On this point, Fiala & Arthur believe that it is dishonest for the CO in reproductive health care to bear that name, as it has little to do with what happens in the framework of compulsory military services: they have a different ethical basis.41
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…CO functions as an institutional escape valve, to avoid all the costs generated by the provision of abortion services in this precarious context. It is a mechanism used not only by professionals but also by entire teams and health authorities, so as not to be responsible for the obligations of respect, protection and of the right to access an abortion, and to take shelter in hostile environments.
………….
Of course, there are also those who have used CO, under the argument of protection of individual moral integrity and moral plurality, to pursue political or ideological objectives (including religious, social, etc.) linked to a traditional sexuality, sexual roles and family forms that are considered the only normal ones. In this way, CO becomes the Trojan Horse in the contested field of reproductive rights.57 This is the case of the use of CO by the Catholic Church from its high hierarchies, who have urged their faithful to use it as a way to counteract the favourable changes to reproductive rights, as Vaggione points out.58 In Argentina, Pope Francis has called on doctors to use CO against abortion and euthanasia, for example.59 So, what was enshrined as a guarantee to protect the moral integrity of people, turns out to be an instrument to deny rights to pregnant women and ignore their integrity and moral agency.
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The proposed regulation is based on replacing the term CO with “refusal to provide abortion services on moral or religious grounds”, as this is considered a more accurate and fairer term to those who knowingly provide or request these services. Bearing in mind that a significant proportion (42%) of the people surveyed for the construction of this proposal considered that the stigma associated with the provision of services is one of the reasons that lead professionals to CO, we believe that it is fundamental to promote a change in the legitimacy of the provision of services and in that sense, we suggest this new designation.

Source, full article in Spanish: CLACAI – Latin America

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CO in Ghana

Prevalence of conscientious objection to legal abortion among clinicians in northern Ghana

John K. Awoonor-Williams, Peter Baffoe, Philip K. Ayivor, Chris Fofie, Sheila Desai, Wendy Chavkin,
Int J Gynecol Obstet 2017; 140: 31–36

Abstract: Objective: To assess the prevalence of conscientious objection (CO), motivations, knowledge of Ghana’s abortion law, attitudes, and behaviors toward abortion provision among medical providers in northern Ghana, and measures to regulate CO.

Methods: Between June and November 2015, the present cross-sectional survey-based descriptive study measured prevalence, knowledge, and attitudes about CO among 213 eligible health practitioners who were trained in abortion provision and working in hospital facilities in northern Ghana. Results were stratified by facility ownership and provider type.

Results: Approximately half (94/213, 44.1%) of trained providers reported that they were currently providing abortions. The overall prevalence of self-identified and hypothetical objection was 37.9% and 33.8%, respectively. Among 87 physicians, 37
(42.5%) and 39 (44.8%) were categorized as self-identified and hypothetical objectors, respectively. Among 126 midwives, nurses, and physician assistants, 43 (34.7%) and 33 (26.2%) were coded as self- identified and hypothetical objectors, respectively. A high proportion of providers reported familiarity with Ghana’s abortion law and supported regulation of CO.

Conclusion: CO based on moral and religious grounds is prevalent in northern Ghana. Providers indicated an acceptance of policies and guidelines that would regulate its application to reduce the burden that CO poses for women seeking abortion services.

Read full article: Global Doctors for Choice

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